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Drafi Recom.mendatian
onWEAG: the cource to befollowed
The Assembly,
(i) Considering that the security and defence of Europe as provided for in the Treaty on European
Union call for independent military means and that this necessarily depends upon an independent Euro-
pean defence industry which is competitive at world level;
(ii) Noting the shrinking armaments market, greater competition in this area and the increased cost of
military equipment, particularly due to technological evolution;
(iii) Noting that Europe has an advanced defence indusfiry but which has a surplus capacity and also
suffers from poor co-ordination of efforts in research and development, technology and production;
(iv) Drawing a comparison between the European defence industry and the American industry which
both need the backing of a large domestic market to amortise investments in research and development,
production and industrialisation in economic conditions acceptable to national budgets;
(v) Noting that three countries, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, have 8O7o of the defence
industry capabilities in Europe;
(vi) Taking into account, however, the fact that no counfiry in Europe can now hope to maintain an
industry which alone would be capable of satisfying all its military requirements;
(vii) Believing that the defence industry should be improved and restructured at national and European
level in order to encourage transnational European firms;
(viii) Considering that the need for European co-operation in armaments matters is based on political,
military, economic and industrial reasons which are still topical and are today more pertinent and impe-
rative than ever;
(ix) Believing that at the present time the strengthening of European co-operation in armaments matters
is an essential condition for maintaining a European defence industry which must form the basis of the
future European defence system which it is destined to serve;
(x) Taking into account the fact that the revision of national military policies and the consequential res-
trictions made in the armed forces of the various countries are a direct and immediate effect of the disap-
pearance of the Soviet threat accompanied by a widespread financial crisis, which justifies a more or less
general reduction in national defence budgets;
(xi) Pointing out that these budgetary reductions, coming at a time when defence policies have to be
defined, are based more on financial considerations than on reasons of security and defence;
(xii) Recalling that many efforts have been made by Europe in the last forty years in regard to armaments
co-operation but not much real progress has yet been made;
(.riii) Recalling, inter alia, the Rome declaration of 1984 whose aims include'o the development of Euro-
pean co-operation in the field of armaments, in respect of which WEU can provide a political impetus ",
that the declaration by the WEU member countries annexed to the Treaty on European Union refers to the
need for enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments o'with the aim of creating a European anna-
ments agency " and that the Noordwijk declaration notes that the elaboration of a European armaments
policy is based, on the one hand, on the activities developed by the Western European Armaments Group
(WEAG) and, on the other, on studies pursued for creating a European armaments agency and on the
conclusions of the informal group of govemment experts of member states of WEU-WEAG and of the
European Union which has just studied the options for a European armaments policy;
(xiv) Considering that the transfer to WEU of the IEPG, now WEAG, is a consequence of the wishes set
out in the preceding paragraph;
(m) Considering that WEAG is the most suitable body to encourage a European defence identity, parti-
cularly because it covers all the activities linked to armaments which are considered complementary and
should be developed in a coherent manner, i.e. the harmonisation of requirements, prograrnmes in co-
operation, research and development and procurements policy;
3
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(mi) Considering that co-operation between state and industry is the surest means of creating a strong
European domestic market;
(ruii) Considering that co-operation is more effective when started at the development stage or even at the
stage of research and that, consequently, it requires a true effort to harmonise operational requirements
between states which WEU does not se,em to be able to achieve at present in the absence of strong politi-
cal impetus;
(niii) Considering that the resources athibuted to research, development and technology by the European
governments are tfuee to four times lower than the resources $anted by the United States Govemment for
these activities and that this disparity is widening further;
(xix) Believing that, in spite of current progress, the EUCLID programme has structural weaknesses and
is thus encountering competition from bi- or trilateral co-operation which is easier to manage;
(tcx) Considering that surplus production capacity should be eliminated wherever it exists, some diver-
sion of capacity, however, should be preserved in Europe insofar as the vital interests of sovereign nations
have to be taken into account;
(sai) Regretting that measures to open European defence equipment markets are not being applied in
practice and exist only as declarations of intent;
(ncii) Considering, however, that the systematic application of fair retum is an economic handicap which
increases costs and surplus production capacities;
Otxiii) Noting the difficulty which the various countries have in reaching agreement on delicate questions
such as competition, the creation of a defence industry and technology base, the backing to be given to
smaller countries and regulations governing procurement;
(:cxiv) Gratrfred that the priorities of Panel Itr include the strengthening of the European defence industry
and technology base, the aim of which is not to wage a war against the United States but to have a com-
petitive European defence industry at world level;
(xm) Emphasising the importance of competition between WEAG and the European defence industries
represented by EDIG for strengthening the industrial and technological basis of European defence;
(ncvi) Regretting, nevertheless, the absence of a true partrrership between the NADs and EDIG and the
absence of an answer from national authorities to the EDIG memorandum on the 1996 intergovernmental
conference;
(xxvii)Fnally, regretting that the NADs, at their meeting on 20th October 1995, failed to reach agreement
on the creation of a European armaments agency;
(xxviii) Noting that at that meeting the NADs preferred not to give an opinion on the creation of a Franco-
German co-operative structure, believing that this decision was a matter for defence ministers at their
meeting in Madrid on 13th November,
Recot!fiuEl.{Ds rHAr rne CouNctr-
1. Concerning the WEAG Panels:
Panel I
- 
establish closer relations between Panel I and the Eurolongterm sub-group allowing members to
establish contact and remain in contact with the national representatives of Eurolongterm in order
to improve the interaction and exchange of information;
- 
redefine the terms of reference of Eurolongterm;
- 
encourage countries to present their equipment replacement schedules in an authentic manner at
equipment review meetings;
- 
facilitate the assistance of land, sea and air experts from each country in equipment review meet-
ings in order to maximise the chances of success of projects identified as potential;
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- 
reflect on the means of achieving the goal of a ten-year plan, updated yearly, for equipping Euro-
pean armed forces, at least for the major programmes;
- 
encourage and institutionalise the harmonisation of operational requirements in order to identify
those which are suitable for the achievement or use of common equipment, taking into account
the need to harmonise military requirements as early as possible, at the research oi development
stage;
- 
envisage the drafting of a white paper identifying defence requirements of European countries in
order to allow them to produce equipment in conformity with joint requirements insofar as
possible;
- 
establish permanent committees between the sub-groups of Panel I and the corresponding CEPA
steering committees;
- 
strengthen relations between Panels I and Itr insofar as questions linked to fair retum, offsetting
and competition, which are obstacles to agreement on the establishment of an efficient European
defence equipment market, are of direct interest to Panel I;
Panel II
- 9Srraf to give greater autonomy to the Research CeIl by giving it the status of subsidiary body ofWEU (passage to step 2) which would allow it to award and follow up contracts;
- 
elYl_sage, as soon as the Westem European Armaments Organisation is created, including the
EUCLID cell in that body in order to give the agency an operational activity and new impetus to
the EUCLID programme;
- 
envisage the possibility for the EUCLID cell, once it has an independent budget, to work our a
research and development plan on the basis of military requirements extending beyond the pres-
ent responsibilities of the WEU Planning Cell and of Eurolongerm;
- 
seek and apply means of rectifying EUCLID's weaknesses by shortening timescales, stream-
lining procedure and facilitating negotiations;
- 
take into account in the EUCLID programme the subjects of research identified in the other co-
operation agreements and frameworks which exist between the WEAG countries;
- 
decide to launch a study on the basis of the one proposed by EDIG on the identification of tech-
nologies considered to be priority for the defence of WEAG countries;
- 
multiply and intensify relations between Panel [I and EDIG on the basis of mutual confidence;
- 
arrange for the Eurofinder machinery which would allow EUCLID to evolve, to become opera-
tional at the beginningof 1996;
Panel III
- 
encourage the creation of European standards for an open market;
- 
reflect on the preparation and final shape of a type of contract to cover procurements in the
framework of the European armaments agency;
- 
decide that the WEAG panels no longer work on a voluntary basis but be composed of permanent
members with full responsibility for the work of those panels in order to gain in terms of time,
efficiency and continuity;
filglly, encourage the establishment of more sustained relations between the various panels and the
ad hoc group, in view of the complementarity and coherence of the work pursued in WEAG;
2. Create a committee of chiefs of staff as a necessary framework for identifying requirements andjoint equipment;
3. Plan a variable geometry European armaments agency which would associate on the one hand in a
wider framework the thirteen counffies to which would apply a set of general rules and regulations and,
on the other hand, in a more restricted framework, countries likely to agree on specific ru16s, and ensure
that this organisation uses the complementarify of Communiry and intergovernmental blocs, taking into
account the fact that the Commission has financial ways and means which cbUa be of benefit to the deTence
industry in Europe;
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4. Specify ways and means of creating the European projects offices;
5. Study changes to the concept of fair retum by means of intelligent compensatory measures or eco-
nomic spin-off, particularly through a policy of existing areas of interest leading to specialisation;
6. Promote the definition of a European defence industry and technology base;
7. Establish a true partnership between the national arnaments directors and EDIG;
8. Urge national authorities to answer the EDIG memorandum on the 1996 intergovernmental conf-
erence;
9. Give its views on the creation of a Franco-German sffucture for co-operation, taking into account
the fact that this initiative is not competitive but complementary.
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Explanalory Memorandum
(submilted by Mrc. Guirada and Lord Dundee, co-Rapporteurs)
I. Introduction
1. The idea of giving Europe an institutional
framework for promoting European co-operation
in armaments is not new. After the end of the
second world war and the establishment of the
western defence alliances, WEU and NATO,
armaments co-operation became a permanent
goal, progress towards which through many ini-
tiatives is, as we shall see later, proving both tor-
tuous and limited.
2. To the political and military reasons origi-
nally underlying these ideas, which are still fully
relevant today, must be added other economic and
industrial factors which the present situation has
helped to make more significant.
3. The choice of Western European countries
to use high technology to improve the perform-
ance of weapons systems has led to steady
increases in the cost of procurement and posses-
sion of armaments. Moreover, the segregation of
armament industries and fragmentation of defen-
ce efforts is leading to costly duplication; at the
same time, the reduction in defence budgets has as
its corollary a loss of purchasing power.
4. Europe must consequently find a place for
exchanging ideas and for joint action to
sffengthen European co-operation in armaments,
now more essential than ever for maintaining a
European defence industry in the service of a
future European defence.
I I. The institutional f-ramew ork and armaments
c o-operation polity : historical background
(a) FINABEL
5. In October 1953, the chiefs of staff of the
armies of France (F), Ita1y (I), the Netherlands
(NL), Belgium (Be) and Luxembourg (L), decided
to form an organisation, FINBEL, the aim of
which was to enable them to study jointly the
measures and means necessary to achieve closer
and more effective co-ordination in the area of
weapons for use on land. ln 1954, the Atlantic
Alliance gave FINBEL de facto recognition as a
regional organisation within its framework but
independent of it.
6. The formation of FINBEL can therefore be
considered as Europe's flrst step towards institu-
tionalising co-operation in armaments; forty years
later this project still features, as an increasingly
urgent item, on Europe's agenda.
7. After joining NATO in May 1955, Germany
was invited to follow FINBEL's work by acqui-
ring observer status and in 1956 it joined that
organisation as a full member'.
8. The United Kingdom, at the time reluctant
to participate in multilateral organisations outside
the strict framework of NATO did not decide tojoin FINABEL until 1972, the date of its entry
into the European Community. The arrival of the
United Kingdom made that organisation coincide
with WEU in terms of member countries, but this
was not the case as regards the objectives of the
two organisations. FINABEUs main object was to
promote close military co-operation between
NATO member countries, which, on account of
their geographic position, shared similar concerns
and needs. To this end, it endeavoured to define
and harmonise operational needs by looking to the
following areas of application:
- 
tactical and logistic studies;
- 
studies ofthe use oftactical units;
- 
studies of military specifications for
equipment for land armies;
- 
studies of training methods and proce-
dures;
- 
joint assessments;
- 
exchanges of information (including
classifi ed information).
9. Joint production of defence equipment
does not fall within FINABEL s area of responsi-
bility, as it is not normally within the remit of
army chiefs of sffi.
10. As a co-ordinating body, FINABEL based
its operations on two principles: complete freedom
of participants and unanimous decision-making.
11. FINABEL was a first attempt to standardise
land-based weapons: the organisation reached a
series of agreements on specifications and opera-
tional concepts and sub-concepts. Once these
agreements were signed, each counfiry was free to
take them into account in their national develop-
ment work in so far as this was considered timely
and appropriate. ln short, FINABEL's work led to
1. From that time FINBEL changed its initials to FINABEL.
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progress, albeit modest, along a path which, as the
facts show, has scarcely been marked by success.
(b) The Standing Armaments Commifiee (SAC)
12. In May 1955, the WEU Council decided to
create the Standing Armaments Committee as one
of its subsidiary bodies. This decision was based
on recognition of the " desirability of increasing
the efficiency of the forces of the countries of
Western European Union and improving their
logistics; of seeking the best method of using the
resources available to these counffies for equip-
ping and supplying their forces and of sharing
tasks in the best interests of all ".
13. The decision of the Council stipulated:
o' The Standing Armaments Committee
shall, in close relation with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, seek to
improve consultation and co-operation in
the sphere of armaments with a view to
finding joint solutions which would assist
governments of member countries in meet-
ing their equipment requirements.
To that end, it shall encourage, on a case by
case basis, agreements or arrangements on
such subjects as the development, standar-
disation, production and procurement of
armaments.
These agreements or arrangements may be
concluded between all the countries of
Western European Union or between some
of them. They would remain open to parti-
cipation by other countries of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation 2.
14. Subsequently, the Rome declaration of
October 1984 and the ministerial meeting held in
Bonn in April 1985 led to the creation of three
new agencies with responsibility for security
matters. Agency ['s task was to study questions
relating to amaments control and disarmament,
Agency tr had responsibility for studying security
and defence questions and Agency III for the
development of armaments co-operation, together
with the international secretariat of the Standing
Armaments Committee.
15. In fact, the Rome declaration included
among other provisions 'o the development of
European co-operation in the field of armaments
in respect of which WEU can provide a political
impetus ".
16. These three agencies and the Standing
Armaments Committee were abolished by the
Council of Ministers of WEU in November 1989.
Paragraph 12 of the decision setting up this com-
2. Decision of the Council of Western European Union
setting up a Standing Armaments Committee, Tth May 1995.
mittee stated that " the government of each mem-
ber country may submit to the Council of Westem
European Union proposals for the modification of
the functions or sffucture of the Standing Arma-
ments Committee in the light of experience
gained and results obtained ".
17. Thus a body has disappeared which, over
its thirty-four years of existence, failed to exercise
the important functions attributed to it and which
never managed to secure the production of equip-
ment suitable for WEU. The development of
bodies with parallel tasks and then the creation in
1976 of the Independent European Programme
Group (IEPG) no doubt hindered the achievement
of the objectives entrusted to the Standing Arma-
ments Committee in 1955, but most probably the
main cause of the failure of the joint production of
arnaments, irrespective of the institutional frame-
work, is the inability of national military staffs to
define jointly their needs and requirements. It
should nevertheless be noted that the Standing
Armaments Committee succeeded in establishing
relations between the authorities responsible for
armaments in Europe, which have, over time,
bome fruit, as various co-operation prograrnmes
show.
(c) Eurogroup
18. Eurogroup was formed on l4th November
1968 as an informal association of defence minis-
ters of the European countries members of NATO.
The purpose of the group was to strengthen the
alliance as a whole by making a more cohesive
and effective European contribution. Eurogroup
was intended to provide defence ministers with an
informal forum to debate questions of particular
political and strategic interest and to promote
practical co-operation.
19. The member countries of Eurogroup are
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey
and the United Kingdom. Neither Iceland nor
France are members.
20. Eurogroup operates on a flexible and prag-
matic basis and the meetings of ministers of
defence immediately prior to the ministerial mee-
tings of the NAIO Defence Planning Committee
(twice a year) lay the foundations for the work of
the Staff Group. The Chairmanship of Eurogroup
rotates on an annual basis.
21. The Staff Group is composed of members
of the national delegations to NATO Headquarters
and its task is to follow up day-to-day work.
The United Kingdom provides the necessary
secretariat.
22. In 1970 Eurogroup launched the European
Defence Improvement Programme (EDIP). This
provided for substantial investment over five
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years in infrastructure work, the development of
an integrated communications network and the
financing of arms procurement and transport
aircraft.
23. Where armaments are concerned, Euro-
group has co-ordinated Europe's procurement of
American equipment, for example the Lance sur-
face-to-surface tactical missile and the F-16 air-
craft purchased by various European countries.
For the organisation of its work, Eurogroup is
divided into a series of sub-groups, some of which
were transferred to WEU subsequent to a decision
of the Council in March 1993:
- 
EUROCOM: Eurocom's work is to en-
sure that the various national communi-
cations systems meet previously fixed
technical and operational requirements
allowing interoperability of the various
equipment in service. From 1985, all
equipment under development has been
required to comply with Eurocom stan-
dards.
- 
EUROLOG: The aim of this subgroup is
to promote logistic co-operation in order
to achieve increased efficiency and
savings in managing the procurement
system. Eurolog has monitored arma-
ments co-operation progmrnmes closely,
identifying logistical aspects of which
further account needs to be taken. We
shall return to this later.
- 
EUROLONGTERM: Its brief is to deve-
lop long-term operational doctrines and
draw up specifications for armaments
and military equipment. In order to carry
out these tasks, Eurolongterm has set
itself two general objectives, to establishjoint operational concepts and to define
harmonised specifications for equip-
ment, both of very great importance and
at the same time difficult to achieve. We
will retum to this subject later.
- 
EUROMED: This subgroup was created
to enhance co-operation in military
medicine.
- 
ELJRONAD: This subgroup brings toge-
ther the National Armaments Directors,
whose aim is to reduce the cost of arma-
ments and defence systems through stan-
dardisation and joint procurement. The
creation of the IEPG virtually brought an
end to the work of this subgroup.
- 
EIJRONATO training: Its purpose is to
organise training in a multinational
framework.
24. After its initial years of consolidation,
Eurogroup has achieved substantial work in
attempting to lay foundations for the standardisa-
tion of armaments and military equipment. How-
ever the absence ofa weapons producer state such
as France has hindered its efforts.
(d) Independent European Programme Group (IEPG)
25. The IEPG, a structure for consultation and
co-operation between the European partners of
NATO except Iceland, was formed n 1976.
26. The creation of the IEPG arose from the
will to increase co-operation between member
countries in the area of defence equipment, the
realisation of the need to promote European co-
operation and the desire to strengthen the cohe-
sion of the Atlantic Alliance and maintain its
conventional forces at an adequate level.
27. The main reasons for creating this body
were to use efficiently the financial means avail-
able for research anci development and the pro-
duction of equipment, to increase the standardisa-
tion and interoperability of equipment, which
implies co-operation in logistics and training, to
maintain a firm European technological and
industrial base and to strengthen European co-
operation in trade areas.
28. In order to achieve these aims the IEPG, in
accordance with the spirit of the Atlantic Alliance
and without calling national responsibilities into
question, carried out work more specifically in the
areas of:
- 
harmonisation of programmes and
equipment replacement timetables;
- 
agreements for carrying out joint pro-
jects;
- 
elimination of duplication of effort in
developing weapon systems.
29. Until 1984, the Group's work was confined
to exchanges of information on national arma-
ments and equipment procurement procedures
and the search for and analysis of possible models
for managing joint projects. Starting in 1984,
IEPG began to meet at minister of defence level
with the purpose of giving greater impetus to
armaments co-operation. Ministers were agreed
on the need to revive the IEPG through more
intense and systematic co-operation.
30. New objectives proposed by the ministers
included the development of European co-opera-
tion in research and technology and a study on
improving firms' competitiveness and sffengthen-
ing Europe's industrial base in the defence field.
This study " Towards a stronger Europe " was
carried out by a group of independent experts and
submitted in early 1987. Among its recommend-
ations should be highlighted the need progressively
to establish an open and competitive market in
armaments, to boost the European research effort
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and provide stimulus to countries with a develop-
ing defence industry (DDI countries 
- 
Greece,
Portugal and Turkey).
31. Following this study, a plan of action was
drawn up with a view to establishing a European
defence equipment market and a European techno-
logical plan, both of which were approved by
defence ministers in Luxembourg in November
1988. Following this same meeting the EUCLID
@uropean co-operation for the long term in defence)
programme was launched 
- 
a joint technological
research programme for military purposes.
32. In 1990, the IEPG structure was joined by
the EDIG (European Defence Industrial Group).
EDIG is a forum created by national professional
associations bringing together the defence indus-
tries of IEPG member countries. EDIG has
undoubtedly contributed to developing co-opera-
tion by giving firms a direct interest in it.
33. IEPG's achievements were modest but
positive. The Group had the advantage of provid-
ing a political framework in which European
defence ministers met regularly in order to define
ways of intensifying armaments co-operation.
However, it has quickly become ugent to put to
use the experience gained in this field in order to
develop a common defence equipment procure-
ment policy in the longer term. Just when the
organisation risked losing all credibility, the
defence ministers decided, in Oslo nMarchl992,
to analyse the future rdle of the IEPG in the new
European security architecture, along the lines
laid down at Maastricht.
(e) The reafiivatian of WEU
34. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of
Defence of the WEU member countries, meeting
in Rome on 26th and 27th October 1984 on the
thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Paris
Agreements modifying the Brussels Treaty,
adopted the Rome declaration 
- 
the true point of
departure for the renewal of WEU, which it was
hoped to relaunch and expand.
35. The Rome declaration was thus the out-
come of the debate conducted in recent years on
the need to strengthen the European pillar of the
Atlantic Alliance.
36. ln short, WEU was to be made an efficient
organisation by taking advantage of the possibili-
ties it offered and adapting it to the new European
reality.
37. The aim of the Rome declaration was to
harmonise views on the security conditions in
Europe and in particular: o'the development of
European co-operation in the field of armaments
in respect of which WEU can provide a political
impetus. "
38. The platform on European security inter-
ests adopted in The Hague in October 1987limit-
ed itself to setting the directions in which the
organisation should work with a view to defining
the conditions and criteria of European security.
The logical consequence of this process would be
the renewal, through the Treaty on European
Union and the annexed declarations, of the aims
described above.
39. Title Y Article J.4 of the Treaty on European
Union stipulates that " The corrmon foreign and
security potcy shall include all questions related to
the security of the Union, including the eventual
framing of a common defence policy, which might
in time lead to a common defence ".Paragraph2 of
this article specifies that " the Union requests
Western European Union (WELI), which is an inte-
gral paft of the development of the Union, to elabo-
rate and implement decisions and actions of the
Union which have defence implications ".
40. The declaration of the member countries of
WEU, annexed to the Treaty on European Union,
which concerns the functions of WEU and its
relations with the Atlantic Alliance states that
" member states agree on the need to develop a
genuine European security and defence identity
and a greater European responsibility in defence
matters ... WEU will be developed as the defence
component of the European Union and as a means
to strenglhen the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common
European defence policy and carry forward its
concrete implementation through the further
development of its own operational r61e ".
41. An aspect of the operational r6le of WEU
referred to in the declaration states that " other
proposals will be examined further, including
enhanced co-operation in the freld of armaments
with the aim of creating a European armaments
agency ".
42. The Council of Ministers for Foreign
Affairs and of Defence of WEU, meeting in Bonn,
in June 1992, approved the Petersberg declaration
and redefined and reinforced the operational r6le
of the organisation: .'WEU member states have
been examining and defining appropriate mis-
sions, structures and means covering in particular
a WEU planning cell and military units answer-
able to WEU... ". These military units available
to WEU and under its authority will be organised
on a oo multinational and multiservice basis ".
43. Finally, in the Kirchberg declaration of
INIay 1994, the ministers tasked the Permanent
Council to begin work on the formulation of a
common European defence policy. A document
on this subject was adopted at the Noordwijk
ministerial meeting in November 1994.In the
Noordwijk declaration " the ministers revived, in
an active and specific manner, thinking on the
10
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future tasks of WEU and its r6le in existing politi-
co-military stmctures in Europe, with a view to
the preparation of the 1996 intergovernmental
conference and also to take account of the evolu-
tion of the geostrategic and geopolitical frame-
work of the European continent 3. 'o
M. As regards armaments co-operation, the
Noordwijk declaration makes clear that the deve-
lopment of a European armaments policy is based
on the one hand on the activities being developed
by the Western European Armaments Group(WEAG) and on the other hand on the studies
being pursued for creating a European Arma-
ments Agency and, finally, on the conclusions of
the informal group of governmental experts of the
WEU-WEAG and EU member states which has
just studied the options for a European armaments
policy. According to this declaration, the issues to
be addressed in order to advance European arma-
ments co-operation and the development of a
European armaments policy are as follows:
- 
the r6le of armaments co-operation in
strengthening the European defence
identity;
- 
the improvement of the interoperability
of armed forces, through, inter alia, the
harmonisation of requirements and stan-
dardisation of equipment;
- 
the reduction ofnational research, deve-
lopment and production costs which
overlap;
- 
creation of conditions for an integrated,
rationalised and competitive European
defence industry;
- 
identification of conditions and measures
which could improve market conditions
for a more competitive approach to
European, including intra-European,
procurement;
- 
for exports outside Europe and in the
context of the informal group, study of
the possibilities of harmonising national
practices, taking into account develop-
ments in arms export controls under a
common European foreign and security
policy and study of ways to ffanslate the
developments of the CFSP into practice
in the area of arms expofi controls.
45. Apart from the transfer to WEU of the
functions of the IEPG (dealt with in the next sub-
section), other measures relating to armaments
co-operation have been taken by the WEU Coun-
cil during the period of reactivation of the organi-
sation.
3. WEU Information report 
- 
Assembly of WEU, March
1995.
46. Information and Eurocom activities were
transferred to WEU at the meeting of the Council
of Ministers of WEU on 19th March 1993, with
the transfer of Eurocom activities taking effect on
lst August 1993 and of the information activities
on lst larluary 1994.
47. Ewolog and Eurolongterm activities were
effectively transferred on 15th January 1994, n
conformity with a joint decision of the WEU
Council and the permanent representatives of
Eurogroup. According to the second part of the
thirty-ninth annual report of the Council to the
Assembly of WEU, " this decision calls in parti-
cular for the formulation of new terms of reference
for each of the Eurolog and Eurolongterm Steer-
ing Groups, so that their activities may be adapted
to WEU requirements ".
48. The firstpartofthe fortieth annual report of
the Council explains the new arrangements for
continuing Eurocom and information activities
(now known as public relations).
49. The main aim of Eurocom is " to promote
interoperability between tactical communications
systems of the land forces of the WEU nations "
and also " to exploit opportunities for interdepen-
dence in systems and equipment development and
production, thereby making the best uses of natio-
nal resources ".
50. Since its transfer to WEU, Eurolog has
become the Westem European Logistics Group
(WELG). This group maintains close liaison with
the Planning Cell and is assisted by three sub-
groups: Maritime, Land and Air.
51. Your Rapporteurs will tackle the question
of Eurolongterm and its terms of reference in
WEU in more detail in connection with WEAG
Panel I.
$) The transfer of the Indeperulent European Programme
Group to WEU: birth of the Westem European
Arntame nts G roup (W E AG )
52. The Treaty on European Union and the
appended declarations were carried into effect
immediately: on 6th March l992,the IEPG minis-
ters of defence, meeting in Oslo, decided to analyse
the r6le the group was to play in the new Euro-
pean security and defence architecture.
53. Shortly afterwards, in Petersberg in June
1992,the Council of WEU Ministers for Foreign
Affairs and of Defence welcomed this decision
and decided unanimously that a group of WEU
and IEPG experts would undertake a study of the
r6le and functions of a possible European Arma-
ments Agency.
54. In December 1992, the IEPG defence
ministers, meeting in Bonn, decided to transfer
the functions of the group to WEU. The ministers
11
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based their approach on a series of basic prin-
ciples stipulating full participation for all member
countries of the IEPG, the creation of a single
European authority in this area to avoid any dupli-
cation, continuity in all armaments co-operation
authorities of policies agreed in the IEPG, mainte-
nance of existing links with NATO, management
of European armaments co-operation activities by
National Armaments Directors (NADs) respon-
sible to defence ministers and, lastly, maintenance
of the links between the IEPG and the EDIG.
55. In Rome, in May 1993, the IEPG defence
ministers agreed practical measures regarding the
transfer of the IEPG to WEU. The armaments co-
operation authority was henceforth to be the
WEAG, supervised by the defence ministers of
the member countries who would meet once a
year (at least) in co-ordination with the WEU
Council of Ministers and, finally, the permanent
secretariat would be transferred from Lisbon to
Brussels (March 1994). As provided for in the
Petersberg declaration, in March 1993 the NADs
created the ad-hoc gloup responsible for studying
the functions of a possible European Armaments
Agency. The group was tasked with studying the
legal bases on which the agency might be created,
its structure, tasks, staffrng and questions relating
to financing, and, finally, relations with both the
European Union and NATO. These questions will
be examined further in the chapter on the Euro-
pean Armaments Agency.
56. At the meetings of the WEAG defence
ministers and the WEU Council in Luxembourg
in November 1993, it was decided to establish, in
the framework of WEU in Brussels o, an arma-
ments secretariat answerable to the NADs, the
staff of which would be recruited under the same
conditions as that of the WEU secretariat. It
should be recalled that the officials working for
the IEPG secretariat in Lisbon were paid directly
by their home countries.
III. Armnments procurement and siluation of
the defence industry in Earope
(a) Budgetary constraints of mililary polity in Europe
57. Although reviews of military policies and
reductions in European armed forces are primari-
ly the direct consequence of the disappearance of
the traditional threat from the East, the underlying
budgetary rationale must not be ignored. Alongsi-
de international constraints, public spending
crises in various countries are the reason for cut-
backs in military budgets.
4. At the same time, the decision was taken to close the
IEPG permanent secretariat in Lisbon.
58. A brief overview of the development of
defence financing in Europe reveals two catego-
ries of countries:
(i) Those which are or were continuing
until now to increase or stabilise their defence
spending both at constant or current prices @en-
mark, France, Greece, Luxembourg and Porrugal).
ln 1994, despite the sensitive position of public
frnances, resources available for financing military
equipment increased more rapidly than the average
of the state budget. The most important arma-
ments programmes are implemented without per-
ceptible change.
59. In France, nevertheless, austerity and lack
of choice became the order of the day for the 1996
defence budget. The removal of F 8.4 billion
worth of defence funding sounded the death knell
for the 1995 military programme law 5 and with it
the hopes of the defence industry in that connec-
tion as far ahead as the year 2000. Title V (equip-
ment) bore the brunt of the cut-backs. " In general
terms the effect of this budget will be a severe fal-
ling off in the number of orders, which will
undoubtedly have serious repercussions on the
industry " 6. The Chairman (RPR) of the Defence
Committee of the French National Assembly, Mr.
Jacques Boyon, recently expressed criticism,
endorsed by many members both from the oppo-
sition and from the majority, of the defence bud-
get presented by Charles Millon 7.
60. It appears that, rather than cancellations,
the Minister of Defence envisages programmes
being delayed, carried forward or rescheduled.
The budget will be reduced by 0.8%o at today's
values (3.37o at constant values) as compared to
the original 1995 Finance Act. In October 1995,
the RPR member, Ren6 Galy-Dejean, Rapporteur
for the defence industries, unveiled a report in
which he stated that the Strategy Committee of
the Ministry of Defence was currently working
on a Title V E assumption of F 75 billion per
annum e, in other words a reduction of 20Vo as
compared with the 1993 armaments budget of
F 95 billion. The consequences were obvious:
withdrawal of major armaments programmes,
loss of tens of thousands of jobs '0, firms in crisis
or threatened with extinction. This would end
France's position as the exception in recent years,
when Germany, the United Kingdom and the
5. The military progftlrnme law passed provided for 0.5Vo
minimum growth as from 1997.
6. See Air et Cosmos, lntemational aviation, 6th October
1995.
7. See the interview with J. Boyon in " Les Echos ", 29th
and 30th September 1995.
8. Annual procurement of military equipment.
9. La Tribune Desfossds, 27th-28th October 1995.
10. The Rapporteur estimates that a total of 50 000 jobs of
the 200 000 in the industry will have disappeared in two
years.
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United States were reducing annaments expendi-
ture by a quarter while France sought increases of
O.5Vo per annum under its original programme.
The only certainties are that priority will be given
to military satellites. Further delays in bringing
the Rafale into service cannot be ruled out after
the cuts in the air force's budget. In October the
Director of Procurement also announced a " stag-
gering " of production affecting in particular the
FLA and the NH-90 and Tiger @urocopter) mili-
tary helicopters. As to long{erm savings on future
programmes (future large aircraft, NH-90 heli-
copter) there would be few savings in the short
term.
61. In July 1995, the Defence Minister, Charles
Millon, decided to create a " sffategic committee "
to give in-depth consideration to preparing a new
military prograrnme, and its implications, particu-
larly for the restructuring of the defence industry.
It is to make specific proposals to the govemment
on adapting the French defence apparatus. It will
be for the defence council to decide, in spring
1996, on major strategic guidelines following the
recommendation of the strategic committee. As
Mr. Millon recently stated: oo We must adjust our
defence costs to the means our country can make
available "'r. As to government priorities, space,
intelligence and research and development are all
to be retained.
(ii) Countries which, since the end of the
cold war, have associated reductions in defence
expenditure with far-reaching restructuring (Bel-
gium, Germany, Netherlands, Spain and the Uni-
ted Kingdom).
62. In 1994, Germnny's defence budget (exclu-
ding pensions) was G DM 47.7 (GF 16l) or SlVo
of France's budget 
'2. This budget fell to its lowest
level in 1995 and seems likely to stabilise in the
years to come in terms of procurement. Financial
efforts made following reunification, the current
recession and the demand by a large section of
German public opinion and the German Parlia-
ment for peace dividends have led to major bud-
get reductions. In 1994 procurement was half that
for 1990.
63. All new military orders are frozen in order
to achieve savings of DM 860 millions and seve-
ral weapons programmes have been abandoned.
64. Defence spending rnthe United Kingdomis
falling sharply. The proportion of defence spen-
ding in the overall United Kingdom budget and
the feeling that that budget could be better spent
in the 1980s led the British Government to try to
11. Interview with the Minister of Defence, Mr. Charles
Millon, La Tribune Desfoss6s, 3rd October 1995.
12. Figures taken from " L'Industrie Allemande de
D6fense " in L'Armement, Revue de la DGA, No. 46,
February 1995.
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make more efficient use of its defence appropria-
tions. Certain actions were undertaken at the time
such as the denationalisation ofthe defence indus-
tries and the establishment of a procurement policy
based on the " best value for money " by the then
Procurements Director, Sir Peter Levene. In the
early 1990s, the United Kingdom Government
was faced with the economic requirement to re-
duce public spending. In defence, this reduction
became possible thanks to the new geostrategic
situation following the end of the cold war. Since
this fust political decision to reduce the defence
budget, the country's political authorities have
exerted strong and unremitting pressure for a
smaller defence budget. Responding to this politi-
cal pressure, the Minister of Defence gradually
brought in a series of ad hoc cost-reduction
measures, before introducing a general policy of
budget contraction. The methods employed by the
United Kingdom for reducing its defence budget
have undoubtedly proved effective since it has
fallen by 20%o n five years.
65. Tota1 defence spending for the financial
year 94195 was f 22700 million, as compared
with f, 23 300 million n 93194. Compared with
92193 and 93194, a slow decline in spending on
personnel is apparent and expenditure on equip-
ment has stabilised. The forecasts for 95/96 and
96197 are f.2172O million and f.21 920 million
respectively. Although it has fallen, the defence
share of GDP was still3.37o tn 1994, above the
average for the main European countries of
NAIO, and virtually the same as for France (3.4Vo
n 1,994).
66. Belgium has decided to place its economic
priorities elsewhere'3. Defence spending in the
Netherlands started to fall sharply in 1993. The
defence budget is frozen for five years.
67. In January 1994, Spain approved a nerrv.
strategic concept compatible with the need to
have available armed forces capable of acting
efficiently when faced with the new risks that now
characterise international relations. In this
context, Spain's defence expenditure started to
fall in constant cost terms in 1990.
68. The law on budget allocation, a progftrmme
law dating from 1982, was extended in 1987 and
1990. Atthough it has been in force since then, it
is, however, not being complied with. The fore-
casts in the joint strategy plan, amended in 1990,
referred to the need to maintain the link befween
the defence budget and the GDP. In fact, the fore-
casts have been revised downwards and this trend
is continuing. The share of GDP allocated to
defence is roughly l.l to l.2%o, while the frame-
work law had established that share as 2Vo.ln
13. In 1992 the govemment decided to freeze the defence
budget at BF 98 billion until 1997.
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1995, the defence budget accounted for 4.08Vo of
the state budget 
- 
less than n 1994.
69. In recent years, Italy has, at one and the
same time, encouraged the formation of its
national standard bearer Finameccanica'a and
attempted to develop a oo Nuovo Modello di
Difesa " (NMD), a new defence model which
will meet the new security challenges of the
geostrategic upheavals of recent years. As origi-
nally formulated, the NMD planned to invest
Giga lira 55 000 in modernising Italy's defence
equipment over the period 1994-2003. This
represented stabilisation of 1991-92 expen-
diture. Funding, regarded by experts as a mini-
mum, was to be allocated to a series of national
and co-operative programmes.
70. However, confining oneself to the 1995
forecasts for the Italian defence budget, the state-
ments made by General Adelchi Pillinini, Chief of
Staff of the Aeronautica Militare Italiana (AMI)
in December 1993 still hold good today. Funding
is obviously entfuely inadequate even to modemise
what can be modemised 
- 
there is no means of
planning and therefore of making choices today
that would allow us to remain crediblet5. The
Minister of Defence had to present a budget for
1995, reduced by 77o as compared with that for
1994'6.Investment has been halved in eight
years. Certain programmes have been deferred,
for example the Ariete tank, and others are likely
to be cancelled, such as the EH-101 helicopter or
the Sircal communication satellite. The Eurofight-
er 2000 is the only programme specifically
included in the AMI's 1995 budget while the
European future large aircraft (FLA), which is of
great interest to the AMI Headquarters Staff and
the Italian aeronautics industry, is still in fact a
distant project.
71. In the light of the policies of European
countries it seems that most countries are allo-
wing themselves to be guided by financial consi-
derations in establishing their military policies,
rather than purely by security considerations ".
72. Italy's defence has improved recently in
1995 and the budget for 1996 nominally shows a
stght increase, although marginally down in real
terms when inflation is taken into account. The
bill on the 1996 budget allocates L 27 143 billion
to defence, representing an increase on the origi-
14. See article " I'Italie forme un p6le de d6fense de 16 mil-
liards de francs " in the Tribunal Desfoss6s, 14th February
l994,page 12.
15. Air et Cosmos, No. 1508, 3rd Mmch 1995.
16. A l2%o rcduction in constant lira as compared with I 987.
17. See Professor Wally Struys, " Les contraintes budg6-
taires de la politique militaire en Europe " (The budgetary
constraints of military policy in Europe), in " t es nouvelles
donnes de la politique militaire de la France ", CASE, May
1994.
nal 1995 Finance Act. Despite this nominal
increase, the defence budget thus falls to l.45Vo of
GDP, as against I.48Vo in 1995. To offset planned
reductions, equipment receives a sizable alloca-
tion. The programmes that benefit specifically are
the Ariete tank, the A-129 Mangusta helicopter
(which as far as delays are concerned compares
with those announced in France for the Tiger),
orders for EH-101s and the Horizon, Eurofighter,
NH-90 and EUCLID co-operation prograrnmes.
(b) Cha.raileristirs of the defonce tudustry in Europe
National dimension 
- 
continuity and development
73. Fifty years after the end of the second
world war 
- 
a period during which national indus-
nial and technological bases for defence in Europe
have been rebuilt 
- 
it is noteworthy that the natio-
nal framework is still the main reference for the
formation and maintenance of a defence industry
and technology base.
74. The closely linked functions of identifica-
tion and affrmation togetherwith economic func-
tions govem the production of military equip-
ment. Some countries such as France, Germany,
Italy, Spaino Sweden and the United Kingdom
have often given priority to investment in their
national defence industries in order to help to
maintain a national identity. Moreover, defence
industry and technology policies correspond to
national choices and considerations.
75. Yet although this national dimension pre-
dominates, it does not go unchallenged. Ministers
of defence, like industrial firms, are aware of the
relative inadequacy of the funding available
to them for maintaining and strengthening the
defence industry and technology base and hence
the need for co-operation. This is an initial limita-
tion on the predominance of the national context
as the main reference for maintaining a defence
industry and technology base. From the very end
of the cold war, national development models for
such bases have progressively been established.
The process of internationalisation of the defence
industry
76. The need to share research and develop-
ment costs, which have increased exponentially,
shorter production runs, the increase in unit costs
and protection of national markets are economic
parameters which explain the expansion and
development of co-operative ventures.
77. [nternationalisation includes the various
forms of international co-operation in research,
development, production and marketing of arma-
ments. Not only has the process increased, but it
also changed in the 1980s and 90s.
t4
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Methods
78. The process of internationalisation has
been accompanied by the emergence of " national
standard-bearers ". These firms, which have a
national monopoly in one or several areas, have
been formed as a result of two trends: national
authorities encouraging mergers or concentration
of production capacities. One of the prime reasons
is the need to have industrial and technological
units whose size and expertise allow them to par-
ticipate in international co-operative ventures.
79. Ad hoc association agreements enabling
foreign firms to submit bids in association with
local firms have recently increased in Europe.
Joint venture companies have grown in number
and in size since the early 1970s and particularly
in the last ten years. This form of co-operation
allows research and development costs to be redu-
ced by pooling and the national markets of the
various partners in the joint venture to be shared,
leading to greater economies of scale and range.
80. As Pierre de Vestel points out, o' joint ven-
tures might be described as the national form of
intemationalisation of the defence sector ". Both
govemments and firms are involved in this move-
ment towards internationalisation, with states
being obliged to grant firms a margin of indepen-
dence. Nevertheless, interdependence in the rela-
tionship between states and monopolistic or
quasi-monopolistic firms in a given area remains
strong. The state and its national standard-bearer
will remain closely linked until a supranational
authority emerges, able to award contracts and
with its own budget.
Europeanisation
81. From the 1960s onwards co-operation18
has increased in Europe, thus beginning a process
of " Europeanisation o', a tem describing the part
of the phenomenon of internationalisation invol-
ving only European partners.
82. The period from 1960 to the mid-1980s
saw the real emergence of the Europeanisation
process. International co-operative ventures,
mostly European, managed and organised by the
state, had as their objective the joint acquisition of
technological expertise. Finally, the process
appears to have reached maturity in the mid-
1980s. The number of agreements bet'reen firms
is increasing perceptibly at the same time as major
development is occurring in the form of these
agrcements.
83. States are now faced with the need to iden-
tify the technological sector or sectors in which
they need to acquire expertise at national level,
those they wish to develop in the framework of
European co-operation and, lastly, the technolo-
gies they will choose to acquire on the interna-
tional market through imports. From the mid-
1980s onwards, the national framework has been
strengthened and renewed; indeed greater flexibi-
lity now characterises the links between the state
and the major armaments industries. There is a
growing awareness of the need to co-operate.
It may be anticipated that the process of Europea-
nisation of Europe's defence industry will conti-
nue in the medium term under the combined
effects of increases in the cost of research and
development and stagnation of or reductions in
defence budgets.
Evolution of the industrial scenario
84. Increasingly, release from state control is
allowing firms wider autonomy. The affirmation
of national standard-bearers, the increase in co-
operation agreements in the European framework
and the persistence of a strong national dimension
have changed the industrial scenario. In this
context, firms have undergone major internal
transformation and have ben obliged to innoduce
greater flexibility into their strategies.
85. It should furthermore be recalled that firms
organise their business on tfuee levels. The natio-
nal level, the area of greatest concentration of
technological experience and know-how, conti-
nues to predominate in the development of their
strategy; the European level, not being institutio-
nalised, follows automatically and probably offers
the greatest promise in terms of oppornrnities for
armaments programmes and legitimacy for the
defence indusfiy in Europe; last comes the inter-
national level, which corresponds mainly to the
market for American equipment and technology
and, for some years now, for Japanese technolo-
gies as well. Some partnership opportunities also
exist with certain newly industrialised countries,
Russia, the Ukraine, and, to a lesser extent, with
certain Eastern European countries.
I ntroduction of c ompetitio n
86. From the 1980s, the traditional organisa-
tion of relations between the state and defence
industries and the relationship between suppliers
and purchasers was ffansformed. The origin of
these changes lies partly in the United Kingdom's
efforts to modify its armaments procurement pro-
cedures, partly in its efforts to privatise its defen-
ce industry. The Levene reforms sought to intro-
duce greater competition into the armaments
market. With the exception of the nuclear indus-
try, the major United Kingdom manufacturers
were privatised. The Single European Act did not
influence defence markets directly, since they
were outside the remit of the EEC (now the E[I),
but the general analysis of their organisation. The
movement had repercussions to a lesser extent onI.8. See the later paragraph on European co-operation.
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other European countries te, including France.
The French authorities took measures to create a
greater distance between the state and the indus-
try. There have been changes in the structure of
the defence industry, especially in the electronic
and aerospace sectors, both intemally and exter-
nally (relations between firms).
Evolution of relations between the civilian and
military sectors
87. Lastly, the defence industry in Europe must
take account of another development in its tech-
nological and strategic environment: a reversal in
the relationship between civilian and military
technologies. There are today dual-use technolo-
gies, the use of which embodies civilian and mili-
tary characteristics alike. This raises the question
of the development of defence industries in this
new context. The adaptation of the industrial and
technology policies of the states of the European
Union constitutes without doubt the major econo-
mic challenge of the post-cold war period.
88. The adaptation of the defence industry and
technology base to the new technological context
is essential to its own survival at reasonable cost
and also represents a major challenge linked to
restoring competitiveness in certain industrial
sectors dependent on defence activity.
The defence industry crisis
89. Since the early 1990s, defence expenditure
in the European countries members of NAIO, has
been falling. This new trend brings to an end the
upward movement which had started in 1970.
90. Between 1989 and 199420 there was a
reduction of l2Vo, which was most marked in Ger-
many. Procurement of military equipment by the
European members of NATO stabilised n 1994.
In the EU member countries, after 68Vo growth in
constant terms between 1975 and 1990, research
and development expenditure was reduced by
16%o between 1989 and 1993. Investment in
research and development was affected less than
production expenditure. In fact the decline in the
turnover of the defence industries of the EU coun-
tries was triggered in 1985 by the fall in exports 2'.
From 60 MECU in 1984 it had fallen to 49 MECU
in 1992.
91. The crisis in the defence industry has had
very serious social consequences. Between 1984
and 1992,410 000 out of a total of just over a mil-
lion direct jobs were lost to Europe's defence
industry and the reduction will probably continue
at the rate of approximately 30 000 a year over the
19. cf. T. Taylor: " Defence industries in intemational rela-
tions ", Review of intemational studies, 1990.
20. Figures taken from the de Vestel Report. op. cit.
21. Exports since 1992 have stabilised.
next few years 2. Between 1993 and 1996 one can
assume that the average number of industrial jobs
lost each year is likely to be more than 37 000 
'z3.
92. Further clarification can be given regarding
industrial and technological aspects. Although
turnover (in the defence industry) has fallen on
average by 2.5 to AVo per annum, profitability of
firms has on the contrary been maintained. Firms
have preserved their ability for self-financing and
internal adjustrnent in order to compete 20. More-
over, while investment in research and develop-
ment, which increased sharply between 1973 and
1990, has undeniably fallen, the fall is less than in
the production of new equipment. The prolifera-
tion of joint development agreements is today
contributing to a better rationalisation ofresearch
and development expenditure. States are reducing
production as a matter of priority, while trying to
maintain research and development funding.
93. Situations differ according to countries and
firms. In the United Kingdom, private firms,
whose business began to decline from 1986, are
not reacting in the same way as French or Italian
publicly-owned companies, in which restructuring
trends have been applied only in part. Privatised
groups subject to competition, such as BAe, GEC
or the German Daimler-Benz Aerospace, have on
the other hand succeeded in surviving the reduc-
tions in military expenditure agreed by their res-
pective governments.
94. European firms are present on the national
and export markets. The value of European
countries' armaments exports plummeted bet-
ween 1987 and 1992, particularly as a result of
the perceptible reduction in armaments imports
to the countries of the third world and the indus-
trialised nations. Over this period France expe-
rienced a sharper fall in its exports than did its
German and United Kingdom neighbours. As
Pierre de Vestel points out, although the value of
arms exports has fallen sharply, the market share
of the four major European countries (France,
Germany,Italy and the United Kingdom) in total
armaments exports rose between 1987 and
1993x. Measured in terms of market share, the
competitiveness of European firms in export
markets is increasing. The share of the European
defence industries in their national markets has
also been rising for thirty years or so.
22. Figwes teken from GRIP, 1995.
23. Figures taken from " L'industrie europ6enne de I'arme-
ment: recherche, d6veloppement tecbnologique et reconver-
sion ", STOA, final report to the European Parliament,
November 1993.
24. See article by Pierre de Vestel, Air et Cosmos/aviation
intemationale, No. 1517, 5th May 1995.
25. From 187o ofthe world total between 1986 and 1988 to
29Vobtwen l99l and 1993.
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Increasingly aggressive competition
95. The development of greatest concem in the
short and medium term is the increasing competi-
tion from the United States which threatens to
weaken and ultimately eliminate European milita-
ry/industrial potential in favour of thai of the Uni-
ted States, which has now become extremely
aggressive. European industries are therefore suf-
fering from greater competitive pressure from a
country which, by its strategy of industrial
concentration, has initiated a trial of strength on
Europe's traditional export markets and in the
markets of Europe. For example, in 1995, Franco-
German Tiger and American Apache helicopters
were in competition in the Netherlands and Uni-
ted Kingdom markets; since European preference
failed to win the day, both countries opted for the
American atrcraft'6,
96. The defence budget expressed in constant
dollars at 1994 prices fell by 35Vobetween 1985
and 1994. From 1994 to 1999 there should be a
further ll%o drop,leading eventually to a budget
of $ 227 billion 27. The procurement, research,
development, testing and evaluations budget fell
over the same period from $ 176 to 81 billion.
Although it was also subjected to budget cuts, the
national base that supports the American arma-
ments industry is still very large. The budgetary
resources of the three countries, France, Germany
and the United Kingdom, taken together, account
for only half of the American budget. Moreover,
the United States armaments industry has a turn-
over of 100 billion ecus, as against 50 billion for
Europe. Although the reduction in military expen-
diture has mainly affected equipment procure-
ment, conversely, the percentage devoted to
research and development has increased conside-
rably. United States spending on research and
development is four times greater than its Euro-
pean equivalent. If this situation continues, the
technology gap will widen to the advantage of
American industry and ultimately there will no
longer be competition between the latter and
European industry in as much as the weapons sys-
tems will not be comparable.
97. Moreover, in recent years this industry has
become increasingly internationalised and
achieves a third ofits turnover from exports. Para-
doxically, the American defence industry is the
least threatened, given its domestic market, which
has made massive efforts over the last five years
to restructure and improve its productivity. The
frst to react to the general fall in military expen-
diture, American industry has eliminated 1.1 mil-
lion jobs since 1987, to which 700 000 further job
26. See AiretCosmos,2ndJune 1995, page 5.
27. AlainCrlmieux " [.e face tr face Europe-Etats-Unis dans
les armements ", D6fense Nationale, March 1995.
losses may be added between now and the end of
1997 r8.
98. ln 1993, Hughes Aircraft bought out the
Missiles Division of General Dynamics. Martin
Marietta absorbed the Aerospace Division of
General Electric and the Space Division of Gene-
ral Dynamics. In October L994, two of the most
important Pentagon suppliers, the Lockheed air-
craft company and the electronic firm Martin
Marietta, organised a " mega-merger ", creating
the world's leading defence oo pole ", a giant com-
pany with a tumover of $ 23 billion.
99. The industrial strategy of the American
Government and industry is to strengthen the first
or second ranking companies in a given field and
eliminate other players through concentration by
means of takeover or merger. Given their size, the
virtual monopolies thus created will be able to
guarantee that united states technological and
commercial capabilities are maintained, despite
shrinking national budgets 2e. American industry
is perfectly structured for export markets and the
ubiquitous presence of the United States Admi-
nistration which has set up support structures for
the defence industry approximating to a true
industrial policy, und6ub^tedly providei unparalle-
led backing when compared to what is available
in the old continent.
100. Thus American industrial concenffation is
creating large-size, relatively specialised firms,
which European companies are attempting to deal
with in scattered order and in fragmented national
markets. In the United States, the missile and satel-
lite sectors s 
- 
and this is also true of other business
sectors 
- 
are now dominated by groups with access
to a large intemal market, two or three times the
size of those of the main European manufacturers.
101. Moreover, the lower dollar means loss of
competitiveness for European firms, with the
added risk of exchange losses. Moreover, the cur-
rencies of two of the three countries with the
strongest defence industries in Europe, the franc
and the mark, are overvalued. Consequently some
Europeans have recently sounded the alarm
repeatedly 3'. The Chairman of Daimler Benz
Aerospace recently referred to the possibiliry of
decentralising part of its production, while the
Chairmen of A6rospatiale and Snecma for their
part stressed the risks this situation held for their
industries. Given the circumstances, European
preference might serve as aparry and at least pre-
serve the European market.
28. See Air et Cosmos, 17th March 1995.
29. Jacques Battistella, Deputy Director for industrial poli-
cy, A6rospatiale. L'armement, No. 43, July-August 1994.
30. " Confrontation a6rospatiale Europe-USA ", Air et Cos-
mos, 10th March 1995.
31. Le Monde,20th April 1995.
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tlz. This review shows that the American
defence industry is healthy, despite major contrac-
tion of its national market owing to the conside-
rable reduction in spending on new equipment
procurement in a defence budget that is rapidly
shrinking. The groups that are being formed in the
United States are flexible, directed towards mili-
tary requirements and henceforth bent on
export 32.
103. Alliances do exist in Europe: in missiles
(A6rospatiale-Dasa and Matra-BAe partnerships),
helicopters @urocopter), satellites (A6rospatiale-
Dasa along with Matra-Marconi, taking over
BAe's satellite branch). The scale of these
regroupings is however limited in comparison
with United States competitors and still leaves
room foroverlapping and margins of competition.
Moreover, increasingly today dealings are with
joint-ventures 
- 
one dfficulty of which being the
division of work between different national firms
- 
rather than true mergers.
I ndus trial re struc turi n g
I04. Contracting markets, national and external,
affected the principal armaments industries in the
1980s, compelling them to adapt to this new
context. Profound changes are still necessary to
regroup capacity and give national firms in Eur-
ope the financial structures they need. A move
towards restructuring in the defence indusfiry has
started. There is a wave of concenffations within
national boundaries in parallel with cross-border
projects 33. Firms must now include in their strate-
gies the need to seek foreign partners to share
research and development costs and markets in a
framework of co-operation. A6rospatiale, which
derives 70Vo of its tumover from international co-
operation (in particular with Dasa), is a telling
example of this present trend. However, although
convergence in the area of missiles has been
mooted for over two years between Matra and
British Aerospace on the one hand and Dasa and
A6rospatiale on the other, in neither case has this
yet been brought to completion.
105. Already under way in Europe, restructuring
is far from complete. State finance is allocated
with.ever-greater reluctance. The critical size is
proving an increasingly essential requirement for
coping with American competition.
106. In France, decisions in this connection are
to be taken next spring on the basis of the work of
the Strategy Committee set up at the Ministry of
Defence. The public sector of France's defence
industry is in an advanced state of financial decay,
its own resources being very often on the verge of
bankruptcy. The state has to find some thirty to
forty billion francs to bring these companies up to
scratch. Moreover, France has three missile
manufacturers (Matra, A6rospatiale and Thom-
son), two satellite manufacturers (Matra and
A6rospatiale), two aircraft companies (Dassault
and Adrospatiale), two radar manufacturers, etc.
107. On the other hand, France's European part-
ners have long been regrouping. In the United
Kingdom, this process has been around two poles,
GEC and British Aerospace. In Germany, Daimler
Benz Aerospace has absorbed virtually all the
aeronautics industries. In this context, France is
going its own way in terms of restructuring, a
situation which is bound to change under the
pressure of budget restrictions and American
competition.
Fragmented capability
108. Over the last twenty years, the develop-
ment of the defence industry in Europe was the
result ofnational policies, each country seeking to
reduce imports and to find export outlets. The cur-
rent fragmentation of the armaments industry in
Europe stems largely from these policies. Like the
United States, the " big " European nations each
have an industrial tool capable of developing the
modern weapons they need for their defence and
technological and research capabilities such as
test facilities and centres, which exist throughout
the sector on the tenitory of the European Union.
However, these capabilities are widely dispersed,
making them vulnerable. There is obvious super-
fluity and massive duplication Y.
Weakening of the dzfence industry andtechnology
base in Europe
109. There will be no European defence industry
without a lastingly efficient, high-performance,
competitive defence industry and technology
base. Identifying that DITB means diagnosing the
present state of health of the armarlent industries
in Europe which is very worrying. Indeed, there is
a structural weakening under the combined effect
of certain factors and developments which in-
clude a shrinking and fragmentation of demand 
-
each national army wants a type of equipment
which meets certain specifications 
- 
and fragmen-
tation of supply 
- 
with the fragmented industrial
operators having dfficulty in reaching the critical
slze.
110. Apart from this shrinkage, a loss of compe-
titiveness in exports is observable. Exports out-
side the Community 35, however, account for only
34. Henri Conze, former Amnments Director of France.
35. Exports outside the Community represent approximately
57o of tumover of the defence industries in WEAG countries.
32. Jean-Paul H6bert, Lib6ration,6th September 1994.
33. Thus, for example, GEC and Daimler-Benz acquired
holdings in Matra; Siemens and GEC divided Plessey's
defence business between them; Thomson and Giat acquired
holdings in various European countries.
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2O7o of the turnover of European defence indus-
tries and this figure is tending to fall, in particular
due to compression of the markets and increas-
ingly aggressive competition. Thus, the arma-
ments industry is dependent on its intemal, practi-
cally exclusively national market. The future of
this indusfry lies rather in the intemal European
market than in national and export markets. Final-
ly the rate of procurement, mergers and restructu-
ring is much slower in Europe than in the United
States.
111. It can easily be deduced from all of these
factors taken together that a cumulative process of
structural weakening of the European DITB is in
progress. This process is not compatible with the
affirmation of a European defence identity and
hence with the objectives of the Maasricht Treaty;
in point of fact, if this trend is confirmed, there is
the risk of it leading to a form of subordination of
Europe's defence industries to American groups
and, in certain specialities, to Japanese industry.
Assuming some form of sub-contracting by the
American defence industry to European indus-
tries, two disadvantages immediately become
obvious: a lack of choice in terms of equipment
and in prices.
ll2. It is difficult to evaluate the DITB correctly
in the absence of systematic, harmonised data. A
working group of European Commission Directo-
rate-General 1A has recently worked on drafting a
report on the defence industry, science and tech-
nology base in Europe. This report puts forward
the idea of a European observatory of the defence
industry, science and technology base for Europe,
responsible for bringing together standard infor-
mation at European level.
(c) Disporilies between countries
Disparities of scale and objectives
113. Defence industries still differ a great deal
from one WEAG country to anothef. The most
obvious structural changes to the defence industry
have mainly affected firms in France, Germany,
Italy and the United Kingdom. Despite rhe grow-
ing trend towards international co-operation
observed in recent years, defence industries still
bear a strong national imprint. They may be
divided into five major categories of count4r 36 :
- 
Countries with nearly comprehensive,
largely autonomous defence capabilities:
this is the case for Britain and France,
which continue to make high commit-
ment of resources to defence research
and development. These two countries
36. See the relevant passages in " Nationalism, internationa-
lism and the European defence market ", Mlliam Walker and
Philip Gummet, Chaillot Papers No. 9, September 1993.
produce almost 6oclo of the military
equipment manufactured in Europe.
- 
Countries with large but incomplete
defence manufacturing capabilities.
These countries' former high dependence
on imports of American technology and
military materials is tending to diminish.
Germany, and Italy to a lesser extento
belong to this category. Spain 37 aspires
to join it, having adopted a strategy of
co-operation some considerable time ago
in order to achieve a firm technology
base 3t.
- 
Countries with sophisticated but highly
specialised defence industries. Belgium,
Denmark and the Netherlands may be
classed in this group.Outside their areas
of specialisation, these countries have
operated relatively open markets and
tend to purchase more from the Ameri-
can industry than from European firms.
- 
Countries with weak industrial infra-
structures. Greece, Portugal and Turkey
fall into this category. These countries
have tried to gain grcater independence
by acquiring their own defence capabi-
lities. They nevertheless remain highly
dependent on foreign technology espe-
cially American technology. Small coun-
tries and those whose infrastructure is
weakare doubly penalised by their smaller
internal markets and by obstacles to
trade with larger countries.
The hard core of Europe's defence industry:
France, Germnny and the United Kingdom
ll4. Any regrouping of the activities of the
armaments industry in Europe can be achieved
only with the involvement of a number of indus-
trial players strongly established in the three most
important countries in this area: France, Germany
and the United Kingdom. ffis does not however
rule out a contribution from the Belgian, Italian,
Netherlands, Spanish and indeed Swedish indus-
tries to a possible regrouping of defence industries
in Europe; it means simply that the weight of the
French, German and United Kingdom industries
is such that nothing can be done without their par-
ticipation. A brief description of the industrial
situation in these three countries shows the major
ffends in each one.
The defence industry in France
37. See F. Garcfa and I. UEbrellec " L industrie de d6fense
en Espagne " (Spain's defence industry), L'Armement,
No.35, December 1992.
38. See J. Mollas-Gallart, Spanish participation in the inter-
national development and production of RMS systems,
Defence Analysis, Vol. 6, 1990.
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Procurement policy
115. France has always sought the widest auto-
nomy in arnaments procurement, which explains
the importance of the industrial component in
French defence policy. The end of the cold war
made it necessary to redefine military missions
and make a marked reduction in defence appo-
priations. Thus the crisis affecting firms in the
defence sector forced political and industrial lea-
ders to reshape the industry.
116. The French Government has always deve-
loped its procurement policy for military equip-
ment by following a basic principle, not shared by
its neighbours: the design andproduction of arma-
ments systems must be carried out on French soil
in order to avoid the undesirable effects of discri-
minatory measures from abroad. However, this
search for independence in weapons design and
production is incompatible with participation in a
large number of co-operative ventures, especially
in Europe, or indeed with the purchase of certain
specific equipment abroad.
ll7. The existence of a vast nationalised or
state-confiolled armaments industry, the wish to
avoid any risk of dependency on other countries
and the concern to exercise very tight control over
exports of military equipment have led the French
authorities to develop an industrial policy which
provides a framework for the French defence
industry. Here again a difference is observable
compared with German and United Kingdom
thinking.
General characteristics of the French defence
industry
118. In quantitative terms it accounts for only
5Vo of world production and 3OVo of that of the
European Union, which is half that of the United
States. However in qualitative terms its world
rank is just behind the United States and Russia
for its broad range of equipment and its perfor-
mance.
ll9. As in many other counffies, France's arma-
ments trade has the dual characteristic of being
concentrated in a small number of large industrial
goups (13 firms 3e achieve almost 837o of global
non-consolidated turnover) and spread over a
large number of firms forming part of the defence
indusfiry 4.
120. The French defence indusbry is now charac-
terised by particularly high technology. The
defence budget accounts for approximately l1Vo
39. A6rospatiale, Alcatel, CEA, Dassault Aviation, Dassault
Electronique, DCN, Eurocopter France, Giat Industries,
Matra Ddfense Espace, Sagem, Sextant Avionique, Snecrn4
Thomson CSF.
40. Approximately 5 000 firms are involved in business that
is partly military.
20
of national expenditure on research and develop-
ment. Defence industry-related firms are an
essential factor in the level of technological and
industrial development in France. The share of
armaments research and development in the tur-
nover of firms is currently 20Vo whtle the average
share devoted to industrial activity as a whole is
3Vo.lthas been possible to mobilise this technolo-
gical potential in the civilian sector where it has
made a powerful contribution to bringing high
performance products to market, especially in the
aeronautics and space sectors ar. However, the
technological fallout is concentrated in a few sec-
tors only.
l2l. The activity of defence-related industries is
generally directed towards civilian applications,
with the two, civilian and military, cross-fertili-
sing one another a'z. Finally, the French defence
industry is quite strongly committed to exports
even though the fall in the latter is exacerbating
the difficulties encountered by defence-related
firms. According to the assessment of France's
Direction G6n6rale de l'Armement (DGA) (natio-
nal procurements office) France's arms sales
abroad in fact plunged by l\-2OVo in 1994, as
compared with previous years a3. The DGA does
not expect an upward ffend before 1996. Govern-
ment directives quite regularly promote exports to
spread development costs across a wider base and
generate a level of activity across the industrial
fabric able to absorb the exchange rate fluctua-
tions to which domestic orders alone would give
rise.
122. Finally the French defence industy is deeply
involved in co-operation programmes, particular-
ly with its European partners, especially Ger-
many. This European trend has been encouraged
for several years by the state. The Minister of
Defence, who supports greater European co-ope-
ration, has in fact requested the French defence
industry to " restructure itself on a European "
scale through French-French and French-Euro-
pean rapprochement. It is necessary for compa-
nies to be large enough to support increasingly
costly programmes.
123. Despite its performancp, the French defence
industry is nonetheless undergoing a serious crisis
due to shrinking markets and tougher competi-
tion. Thrnover in constant francs (GDP) has fallen
sharply in volume terms by 23%o between 1984
41. See " L'avenir des industries li6es d la d6fense ", Com-
missariat G6n6ral du PIan, tndustrial Srategy Group chaired
by Marcel B6nichou, La Documentation Frangaise, Novem-
ber 1993.
42. J.P. Gillybceuf, Director of the Central Industrial Affairs
Department at the French Direction Nationale de I'Arme-
ment, " U6volution du paysage industriel frangais de I'arme-
ment " in D6fense Nationale, March 1995.
43. T\e volume of export orders reached its lowest level
since 1990. See Le Monde,6th October 1990.
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and 1993. The number of direct defence-relatedjobs plungedby 27Vo between 1984 and 1993,
from 291 000 to approximately 214 000. The
export share of that turnover has fallen almost
continuously from 42Vo n 1984 to 2Oclo n 1993,
which in part explains the industry's present diffi-
culties. According to the Chairman of the Natio-
nal Defence Committee, Mr. Jacques Boyon, the
defence budget submitted recentlyoo does not take
the needs of the defence industry into account ".
Bearing in mind the savage cuts in equipment fun-
ding, the industry is experiencing the effects of
prograrnmes being staggered 4. The " shrinkage
of the fabric of France's defence industry seems
inevitable and perhaps irreversible 'o 05.
124. The strategic committee established by
Defence Minister, Charles Millon, should, among
its other tasks, settle the problem of the need for
own funding of government-supervised firms:
A6rospatiale, Snecma and Giat lndustries *, ffid
the matter of their possible privatisation (in the
short term that of Thomson). Public sector indus-
trial groups working for the defence industry and
encountering dfficulties in adapting to a globally
declining market are stating their need for an
injection of F 15 to 20 million. The gap between
the needs of firms and the sums available is consi-
derable o'. Charles Millon has said that he will
oppose the recapitalisation of armaments firms
without a medium- and long-term target plan.
" Recapitalisation should not be a financial trans-
fusion... but one counter in a true industrial stra-
tegy * ". Moreover, inflation of the cost of milita-
ry programmes coupled with a tightening of
budget restrictions will sooner or later make
necessary a review of the doctrine oe that" off the
shelf " purchases of equipment cannot be entertai-
ned. (This expression means all equipment avai-
lable on the market). The armaments Director
General, Mr. Henri Conze, threatened last January
to abandon certain programmes if the defence
industries refused to lower their prices by 2%o per
annum befween 1995 and 1998. Finally two other
sensitive projects, arsenals and satellites (discus-
sed later) are to be dealt with shortly.
The United Kingdom defence industry
44. T\e most expensive programmes are those worst affec-
ted. The Rafale is one that has been staggered this year, as in
previous years.
45. Air et Cosmos, No. 1525, 30th June 1995.
46. Giat, which inherited the state arsenals of land-based
weapons and is the manufacturer of the [rclerc tank, has
continuously made losses since 1992.
47. A6rospatiale estimates its own capital funding require-
ment to be F I0 billion, as does the Thomson group. The
Snecma engine group, which according to its own President
and Director-General is " virtually bankrupt ", has evaluated
its requirement at F 6 billion. Source: t es Echos, 22nd Sep-
lember 1995.
48. Interview with the Minister of Defence for France, Mr.
Charles Millon, in the Tribune Desfoss6s, 3rd October 1995.
49. See Le Nouvel Economiste, 1th Aprrl1994.
L25. Like France and Germany, the United
Kingdom has a long tradition of national manu-
facture of high performance weapons by a power-
ful and efficient industry. The United Kingdom
combines a wish to maintain close links with the
United States with steadfast efforts to maintain
wide independence in the design and manufacture
of its weapon systems. This policy required the
establishment of a national defence industry
which has remained competitive despite the eco-
nomic difficulties experienced by the United
Kingdom for many years.
Procurement policy
126. The principle on which United Kingdom
procurement policy is based is that of " improved
value for money o'. The United Kingdom Govern-
ment uses the process of competitive tender as
widely as possible, most often with British firms,
but also with foreign suppliers in order to obtain
for a given budget the best possible equipment in
terms of performance and running costs. The
government is not opposed to international co-
operation with American or European partners,
provided it is in the United Kingdom's interest.
I27. The Minister of Defence has furthermore
envisaged developing co-operation in research in
Europe. A programme known as " Beacon " and
intended to promote increased collaboration
between the governments and industries of Euro-
pean countries is to be launched before the end of
1995. In a lecture by Peter Ewins, chief scientist,
on 5th July 1995, to representatives of the United
Kingdom industry, the idea was explored of defin-
ing a European armaments procurement strategy
which favoured upstream agreements on future
armaments technologies. Indeed, the Ministry of
Defence recognised that the United Kingdom no
longer had the capability to develop armaments of
increasing complexity alone. Peter Ewins further-
more proposed that the industry should work with
the Ministry for defining future technologies and
areas (dual-use) in which a specific search for
synergies with the civilian side would help to
reduce the time required for developing future
armaments.
128. After his talks in Febru ary 1995 with France's
Armaments Director, Mr. Conze, and the then
Defence Minister, Mr. L6otard, Mr. Freeman,
repeatedly in contact with France and Germany,
reaffrmed the United Kingdom's intention to take
a close interest in various European prograrnmes,
such as the future large aircraft (FLA) prograrnme
in which the United Kingdom has decided to par-
ticipate in the near future, provided a number of
conditions are met, inter alia, an Airbus-type
industrial organisation, light armoured vehicles in
conjunction with the Franco-German modular
armoured vehicle prograrnme, military communi
2l
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cation satellites, and long-range air-to-air missiles
for the Eurofighter aircraft.
129. However, budget forecasts, largely based
on off-the-shelf procurement, do not favour Euro-
pean co-operation. Moreover, the united King-
dom decision in 1995 to choose the American
Apache combat helicopter rather than the Franco-
German Tiger is a reminder that the main criteria
for the choice of armaments are still different on
either side ofthe Channel: over and above the best
value for money criteria on the one hand and
European construction on the other, one side gives
priority to technical and operational links with the
United States and the other the prospect of a
wholly self-sufficient European armaments orga-
nisation 50.
130. Finally, the government actively supports
armaments exports. However, its thinking on
industrial policy is characterised by the very
liberal direction given it by the former Prime
Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, and is thus very different
to that of the French Government. In the 1980s,
the then govemment privatised many public sec-
tor firms, Royal Ordnance Factories and the state-
owned naval dockyards.
General characteristics of the United Kingdom
defence industry
131. All defence-related firms are now owned
by private capital and the capital sffucture is more
fragmented than in France. Moreover, large com-
panies are generally less dependent on military
orders than their French neighbours. Comparable
in size and expertise to the French defence indus-
try, the United Kingdom industry is present in
most armaments sectors including the nuclear
industry. This is also true of project managers for
major weapons systems, parts manufacturers and
principal collaborators. BAe, the first defence-
related industrial group in the United Kingdom,
has extended its activity to all armaments sectors
and GEC, the second, is extending its core busi-
ness, electronics, to naval construction.
132. Thanks to the growth (16%o) in military
sales, and to resffucturing 
- 
which has led to 47Vojob losses after three loss-making years, BAe has
again moved into profit (over F 1.7 billion ").
Resffucturing measures, particularly the elimina-
tion of under-performing businesses) and a reduc-
tion in production costs, together with staff cut-
backs, have brought about the recovery according
to Richard (Dick) Evans, Chairman and Mana-
ging Director of BAe. Indeed it has essentially
been military activity (aircraft and missiles) that
has boosted the 1994 turnover for the United
50. ICA Barth6lemy, United Kingdom armartrents attach6,,
Bulletin d'lnformation du Service de I'Attach6 d'armement,
September 1995.
51. See Air et Cosmos, International Aviation, No. 1509,
l0th March 1995.
Kingdom defence industry, all the more remark-
able in the present context.
The German defence industry
Procurement policy
133. The principle on which German procure-
ment policy is based is to safeguard, wherever
possible, the interests of the national industry. The
German Government however does not rule out
any form of co-operation, whether based on part-
nership with European countries or with the United
States. The rising power of the German defence
industry is at present leading the German authori-
ties to direct German policy towards national
choices or co-operative projects such as the
HACI{APruHU helicopter (or Tiger) with France;
the NH-90 hetcopter, with France, Italy and the
Netherlands; the AC-3G third generation anti-
tank missile or Trigat, with France and the United
Kingdom, and also Belgium and the Netherlands
for the medium-range version; the Eurofighter
2000 and its EI-200 engine with the United King-
dom, Spain and Italy.
134. In theory the typically French concept of
industrial policy is not part of the liberal vision of
the German economy. A true political will has,
however, encouraged massive regrouping of
defence-related firms and promoted the importance
of the confidential armament-industry circle,
which periodically brings together relevant offi-
cials from the German Ministry of Defence and
the chairmen of the major German armaments
firms.
135. Regarding exports, although the regula-
tions applied in the matter are restrictive in prin-
ciple, they are circumvented on occasion: indeed
certain industries manage to evade the controls,
others export dual-use goods and technologies.
Since reunification, Germany gives less and less
the impression of being a country anxious not to
be regarded as an arms exporter, especially since
the German Government recently decided to relax
export regulations.
General characteristics of the German defence
industry
136. Like France and the United Kingdom, Ger-
many has for some time been acquiring indepen-
dent means of producing the equipment required
for its armed forces. Following the dismantling of
its amraments industry after 1945, West Germany
remained dependent on other countries, particu-
larly the United States, for its mititary procure-
ment. During the cold war, its armaments procu-
rement policy was based on " off-the-shelf "
purchasing or manufacture under licence. Despite
these limitations, the German arnaments industry
was nevertheless able to develop co-operation
with allied countries, in particular the United
22
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States, France and the United Kingdom. After
reunification of the country in 1990, Germany
strengthened the movement to restructure its
armarnents industry thus restoring its power and
efficiency. Defence industry activities were
entrusted to various goups directed towards civi-
lian applications.
137. The German defence industry was struc-
tured around large national firms with a solid
financial base, partly because they frequently had
the backing of powerful, diversified industrial
groups.
138. The German defence industry is concentra-
ted around a few large groups where the " arma-
ments " side is at times a subsidiary activity:
Daimler-Benz Aerospace (Dasa) in aeronautics;
Diehl, Krauss-Maffei and Rheinmetall in wea-
pons for ground forces; Siemens in electronics;
Bremer Vulkan in naval construction. These firms
are largely controlled by private capital held by
$oups or large financial or banking institutions.
None of these groups concentrates exclusively on
armaments production. Defence is a subsidiary,
indeed a marginal, business interest in the civilian
groups; only the firms in the sector concerned
with armaments for ground forces achieve
approximately half of their turnover through
defence activities. It is to be expected that this
figure will fall in the years to come.
139. This industry employs approximately
140 000 people and achieves an annual turnover
estimated at around DM 15 billion (F 51 billion)
and exports roughly l5-2OVo of turnover.
140. Until now, German defence-related indus-
tries had coped more easily with considerable
reductions in defence funding than have French
industries. Conversely, its financial soundness
was at the expense of a loss of specialisation.
The financial situation of the German defence
industry has nevertheless worsened in recent
months.
l4l. Moreover, firms whose activities have
long been geared to the defence industry are ten-
ding to consolidate their business in dual-use
technologies and goods. Furthermore, Germany
gives priority to technological sectors based on
prime areas. Companies such as Dasa or Siemens
hope to be able, as the German defence white
paper advocates, to develop their activities in high
technology sectors where they are already compe-
titive and where there are numerous ties between
civilian and military technologies 52. Seriously
affected by the fall in military orders, Dasa has
redirected its activities towards the civilian sector
which it is seeking to develop.
!2. See the 1994 white paper, Federal Defence Ministry,
5th April l994,page 106.
142. The German armamenrs industry has been
experiencing serious difficulties since 1994. It has
compensated, but only partly, for the loss of eam-
ings resulting from the drastic reductions in
Defence Ministry procurement by substantially
increasing its exports.
1.43. In 1955, the leading German industrial
group, largely controlled by Dasa and Fokker, in
1995 registered its heaviest losses in the firm's
history. This situation reflects the difficulties of its
subsidiary Dasa, which alone made operating
losses of DM 1.6 billion as a result of exchange
losses and restructuring costs. One of Dasa's main
problems is that 74Vo of itsproduction is achieved
in marks and only 27Vo of sales are in dollars. The
result for the second half year will be determined
by the evolution ofthe exchange rate scenario and
above all by the provision necessary for the
Dolores programme s3, which concerns the Dasa s
networks, Juergen Schremp, Chairman of the
Daimler Board, said recently. According to the
German press, some 15 000 jobs might be lost at
Dasa between now and 1998.
14y'. The leaders of the eight Liinder involved in
the aeronautics and aerospace s5 industries sent a
message to the Federal Govemment last September
asking it to increase his political, financial and legal
support and ensure that current programmes went
ahead. Manfred Bischoff, Chairman of Daimler-
Benz Aerospace, insisted on the need to retain jobs
in what Germany regards as a strategic sector 56.
145. This show of force by the German aerospace
industry in demanding increased government sup-
port for the industry was a new departure in its
relations with the state which has no parallel in
France and the United Kingdom. It made clear
that the indusfiry was threatened, as elsewhere in
Europe, by the combined effect of lower defence
appropriations and fewer civilian and military
orders, the whole being magnified by the " dollar
effect " 57.
L46. The Bonn Govemment is refusing to grant
additional public funds until drastic cost-cutting
measures have been implemented. In broader
termso the Liinder are asking the government also
to intervene at European level to obtain additional
subsidies and the creation of stnrctures to enable
the indusfiry better to meet competition, especially
from the United States.
53. The Dolores working group aims to reduce Dasa's
dependence in relation to the dollar.
54. See [,e Monde, 13th September 1995.
55. ln September 1995, Wolfgang Piller President of the
German Association of Aerospace industries (BDLf) stated
that in five years the Gemran indusay had lost 40Vo of um-
over and emplo)rmenl
56. See Le Monde, 27th September 1995.
57. See Air et Cosmosflntemational Aviation, No. 1533,
29th September 1995.
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Two second-line players: Italy and Spain
147. ln ltaly, defence industry turnover has
regularly declined since 1993. The Finmeccanica
group rescued the armaments companies of the
Efim group in February 1994. This in fact consti-
tutes the first Italian defence conglomerate
accounting for 65 to 70Vo of national capacity in
this sector. Research and development is consid-
ered to be a particularly strategic area for the
group as a whole, on which its Chairman has
decided to spend l0.5%o of the holding company's
income. The armaments activities of the holding
company relate to ground equipment, missiles,
electronics, space and telecommunications. They
were rationalised through reductions in staff, the
search for European partnerships and changes in
financial structures, but without, however, any
new outlets emerging either in terms of domestic
or export orders.
148. It should be noted however that the Paris
airshow last June provided an opportunity for the
Italian industry to present itself for the frst time
in its grouped form, after firms had restructured,
in advance of other European countries. In parti-
cular, the Finmeccanica group 58, which today
accounts for 70Vo of the productive and market
capacity of the aerospace sector, presented its
three aerospace companies under one flag.
Conversely, the renewal of the armoured vehicle
fleet is continuing, crippled by spiralling costs
and with highly uncertain prospects for the arma-
ments industry. With doubt already hanging over
the Ariete, whose cost will be far greatq than any
advantages it may offer and which will therefore
have no real export outlets, it already seems cer-
tain that ltaly will not produce a single tank. If the
ground-based construction sector survives in Fin-
meccanica, it seems likely that it will look
for partnerships, hence Italy's interest in Franco-
German co-operation of the modular armoured
vehicle type.
149. Although a movement towards concentra-
tion and rationalisation has begun in Italy, particu-
larly in the area ofdefence electronics, production
remains very fragmented. The Italian defence
industry is pursuing three objectives which it is
having difficulty in achieving: rationalisation,
technological development and internationalisa-
tion. Italian equipment will no longer be competi-
tive except in certain specific markets and the
entire sector seems to be at the timit of survival 5e.
Programmes such as the Eurofighter 2000, the
EH-101 and NH-90 helicopters, the future large
aircraft and the FSAF are all more or less behind
58. Finmeccanica's tumover stood at 12 117 billion lira for
1994.'Ihe aerospace and defence sectors account for 32 and
lTVo of group revenue (respectively).
59. See Lettre d'informations stratdgiques TTU, No. 106,
7th September 1995.
schedule. Moreover pressure from American
firms on Italian decision-makers in equipment
matters is becoming increasingly insistent.
150. Ttre Spanisft armaments industry is at the
same time concentrated and scattered. Indeed, on
the one hand there are few large groups and
project-leaders are virtually in a monopoly posi-
tiono on the other there are numerous small- and
medium-size businesses in the sector. The Spanish
defence industry is largely state-owned. For some
yffirs now, the modemisation of industrial struc-
tures seems to have been a priority in order to
increase productivity. A movement towards
concentration has been set in motion to improve
the productivity of the public holding company,
the INI (National Industry Institute) which has a
virtual monopoly of naval construction, heavy
artillery and electronics. This industry's turnover
is approximately one fifth of that of the French
defence industry.
151. According to the association of Spanish
defence industries, AI1ARI\I{DE (Asociaci6n de
Fabricantes de Armamento y Material de Defensa
de Espafra), four firms account for 75Vo of Spain's
amraments production and 80%o of employment in
the sector: Casa (aircraft),Bazan (naval construc-
tion), Santa-Barbara (weapons for ground forces)
and Indra Sistemas (electronics). The aerospace,
electronics and naval sectors account for over
90Vo of the Spanish defence industry production
and each sector is dominated by one or two firms.
As each firm specialises in a product or a group of
products, there is effectively no competition
between the various Spanish companies working
on defence.
152. The aerospace business is concentrated in
Casa. The group is developing a number of pro-
grammes, among which the CN-235 transport afu-
craft with a relatively high potential for penetra-
ting foreign markets. Casa is also participating in
the Eurofighter programme. This competitive
group exports almost 75Vo of its production. In
spite of the unfavourable economic circumstances
of the civilian and military aeronautics industry,
the Spanish manufacturing company ended the
lgg4fnancial year with a net profit of F 140 mil-
lion o, which confirms the recovery heralded in
1993. The sector of weapons for ground forces is,
howevero experiencing a serious crisis due to
overmanning, a fall in domestic demand and low
productivity. Santa-Barbara began a major adap-
tation prograrnme in recent years, but structural
problems persist.
153. In the view of Mr. Prieto Vi.fluela, the inter-
national situation is not entirely sufficient jusffi-
cation for the crisis in the Spanish defence indus-
try. The structural reasons for the crisis in the
24
60. Figure taken from Irs Echos, 15th June 1995, page 15.
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armaments industry are manifold, among them
the fall in internal demand (the Defence Minis-
try's procurement budget has fallen from F 8.4 to
2.1 billion) very limited investment resources,
few staff with high technology expertise, a weak
production infrastructure, low productivity of
both industrial plant and personnel, a low level of
competitiveness and, according to the opposition,
lack of consistency in the military planning law.
154. According to the Popular Party, the main
opposition part], the following conclusions 6'
have to be drawn: the structure of Spain's industry
does not allow the consolidation of markets and of
the Spanish defence technology base. It will there-
fore be necessary to increase investment and
sffengthen the national technological infrastructure.
The Popular Party has moreover proposed a plan
consisting of privatisation-based measures to
rescue the defence industry 52. This would concern
Casa, Santa-Barbara's armoured vehicle business
and Bazan's weapons production. The party is
proposing to revise planning by introducing grea-
ter transparcncy in the award of contracts to firms
in the industry and encouraging European co-ope-
ration.
(d) European co-operatinn in armaments
155. Economic and industrial necessities and the
European Union's plan to develop a common
security policy and therefore a credible European
defence require Europeans to broaden, even gene-
ralise, co-operation in armaments matters in
forms that are likely to reduce the obstacles and
dfficulties encountered to date.
(i) Co-operation in armaments research and
technology
156. Over the years, experience has shown that
without similar technological bases, armaments
co-operation could no longer be achieved naturally.
France, Germany andthe UnitedKingdom, which
alone finance over SOVo of European defence
research, cannot compete with the United States
in all areas, given that their spending levels are
three times lower. It is therefore necessary for
Europe to develop upstrearn co-operation in order
to avoid duplication and offer a forwardJooking
vision of the industrial landscape for future co-
operation.
157. In recent years it has become evident that
bi- and tri-lateral co-operation among Europeans
has increased. A case in point is the Anglo-French
memorandum of understanding on military
61. La industria de defensa en Espafla de J.J. Prieto Wiuel4
Fundaci6n para los Estudios Sociales Papeles de la Funda-
ci6n, No. 22.
62. lnformation obtained from TTU No. 66, l9th October
t994.
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research signed in 1989. According to Mr. Peter
Edwins 63, agreements of this type have increased
considerably both in number and in value
(17 agreements in force in 1994).
158. The fact that research programmes inevita-
bly last several years is one of the brakes on jointly
financed programmes involving a division of
work; joint planning of armaments needs and pro-
grammes in Europe is still at an early stage.
Moreover, account must be taken of the real risk
of a programme such as Euclid competing with
bi- and trilateral co-operation.
159. According to Mr. Benichou e, although it
has not for the moment led to a significant degree
of interdependence, the fiend seems to have become
well-established. However, progriunmes carried
out in the framework of these types of co-opera-
tion mainly concern exploratory developments
and do not take sufficient account of the explora-
tory analysis of " the best indusfial a:rangements "
and interministerial agreements leading potential-
ly to joint production and development.
(ii) Essential co-operation on programmes
160. ln 1994, a French white paper on defence
stated that it seemed co-operation was bound to
apply to future major conventional armaments
prograrnmes, while the German Government sta-
ted clearly in its 1994 white paper that armaments
co-operation should be increased at European
level within the framework of WEAG.
Advantages and disadvantages of traditional
forms of co-operation
161. " Arranged marriages " are still the most
colnmon form of co-operation in Europe, particu-
larly for manufacturing major sophisticated sys-
tems. At the political and economic level, co-ope-
ration, described by W. Walker and P. Gummet 6s
as oo an arranged combination of productive
resources ", in theory enables costs and risks to be
shared between the partners and a reduction in
duplication of skills and test and production faci-
lities. At operational level, the use of the same
equipment by several headquarters staffs
increases interoperability with considerable
financial advantages.
162. Nevertheless there are several disadvan-
tages. For example the definition of common
requirements often leads to the production of
more sophisticated, and hence more expensive,
equipment than is strictly necessary. Application
63. Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser, Unircd Kingdom
Ministry of Defence.
64. Revue D6fense, No. 64, June 1994.
65. Nationalism, Intemationalism and the European Defence
Market, Chaillot Papers, ISS, WEU, September 1993.
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of the fair return concept has created an artificial
balance in work sharing, leading to the main-
tenance, and indeed the creation, of surplus pro-
duction potential. The difficulties encountered
after renegotiation of the ACE project in 1992
bear witness to the extent of the problems to
which this principle can give rise. EDIG is now
proposing to substitute this non-economic prin-
ciple, which is a barrier to competitiveness, with
that of economic return.
163. In short, co-operation is, on balance, con-
sidered to have been generally successful by a
majority of senior figures in politics and industry.
Despite certain " model " structures (for example
Euromissile) many consider the present model of
co-operative production, owing its structure to a
specific historical context that has conferred upon
it a function that is primarily diplomatic, to be
outmoded. In 1989, the Armaments Delegate,
Yves Sillardo expressed a point of view on co-ope-
ration that served as a waming by underlining that
the advantages of the latter were often heavily
outweighed by extended deadlines, lengthy nego-
tiations and financial costs.
Evolution of industrial co-operation
164. Emile Blanc stresses that co-operation
will prove to have been one stage in the develop-
ment of industrial structures but certainly not the
last, falling as it does between the concentration
of integrated companies and the creation of new
ones. Alliances will be determined increasingly
by the industrial, " capitalist " approach of cost
saving and the acquisition of market shares. One
might share John Wistory's 6 view that the major
change at present taking place in the industrial
environment is the formation of European trans-
national companies. However, although there is
more dialogue between leading top management
in industry, this does not necessarily imply a
merging of strategies. Thus, for example, British
Aerospace and Dassault have held discussions
on aircraft projects, while BAe and Thomson
CSF failed to merge their divisions (Eurodyna-
mics); GEC-Marconi and A6rospatiale have,
however, reached agreement on missiles. This
situation implies that there are flexible and
changing alliances and that stable alliances
between companies are unlikely in the short
term. Many firms have acquired the habit of col-
laborating at division level and sought to forma-
lise their relations by referring to themselves as
" Eurocompanies ". Although dependent on their
parent company, they are beginning to act as
separate industrial entities (Eurocopter, Matra
Marconi Espace, etc.).
66. Chairman and General Manager of British Aerospace
Defence Ltd.
Some maj or co-operation programmes
165. Many endeavours have reached completion
or are in progress. Joint development and produc-
tion programmes can be counted in dozens and
cover a variety of fields. Although the list is not
exhaustive, the examples given below might be
mentioned.
166. In the naval field, obvious examples are the
tripartite mine-huntet the MU90 torpedo and the
new generation Anglo-French-Italian Horizon fri-
gate. To avoid accumulating programme teams
and national variants as in the past, the Horizon
progmmme marks the introduction of a new org-
anisation closely modelled on the Airbus consor-
tium. A single framework agreement, signed in
July 1994, gives the go-ahead for the develop-
ment, construction and in-service monitoring of a
single class of frigate. The Joint hoject Office
(JPO) in London is responsible for progralnme
management and will award contracts to one
industrial lead contractor, the IryC 67. The aboli-
tion of rules on the detailed and pre-established
disribution of work is another innovation which,
as Mr. H. Guillou, Director of the JPO, empha-
sises, encourages competition between firms and
" marriages " between the most competitive divi-
sions of each company.
167. In terms of land-based equipment mention
may be made of the multiple launch vehicle
(MLV), the Cobra radar system, and for the future,
the modular armoured vehicle (MA$.
168. In the field of military observation satel-
lites, obstacles of a financial and diplomatic nature
connected with domestic policy are preventing a
partnership between France and Germany from
being finalised 6, especially as Germany seems
very interested in technological progress in the
United States. It is still in fact hesitating between
the Helios 2 and Osiris 4 programmes, conductedjointly with France, and the project submitted by
the American Lockheed company. If Bonn were
ultimately to favour the European solution, Spain
and Italy, having withdrawn from Helios 2,might
rejoin the project 6e.
169. The Franco-German satellite partnership
must have a corollary within the satellite industry.
A6rospatiale and Dasa have for some time been
preparing for closer links on an equal footing,
based on the principle of co-decision but with
headquarters in Germany and a joint management
board led by a German Chairman. This joint ven-
ture, known as the " European Satellite Industry
(ES[) " will be the leading satellite company in
Europe and give fresh impetus to co-operation, in
67. Consising of DCN International (France), Finmeccanica
(ttaly) and GEC Marconi Naval System (United Kingdom).
68. L,es Echos, l6th October 1995.
69. Defense News, 25th September 
- 
tst October 1995.
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as much as it transcends a mere economic interest
grouping or joint programmes, such as the Tiger
helicopter. As the lead conffactor for Helios 2, the
French company, Matra, has recently publicly
proposed taking over from A6rospatiale and
acquiring its satellite branch in the process, in
order to join forces with Dasa. The French autho-
rities would, however, prefer to create a Franco-
German concem in the form of A6rospatiale-Dasa
to match the Franco-British Matra-Marconi Space
venture (MMS) set up in July 1994.ln prospect
would be the creation, in the long run, of a single
European satellite company, to compete with
the American Hughes and Lockheed-Martin com-
parues.
170. In terms of missiles, mention may be made
of the Franco-German Hot and Milan anti-tank
missiles, the Martel anti-radar missile, the Roland
ground-to-air missile. Moreover the expected
alliance betrveen Matra D6fense Espace and British
Aerospace might shortly come into being. The
formation of a fifty/fifty joint venture, with sub-
sidiaries in the United Kingdom and France,
would lead to the formation of Europe's foremost
missile manufacturer in Europe in terms of the
extent and diversity of range, taking in virtually all
missiles... except nuclear weapons.
t7l. In the aeronautics field, reference should be
made, inter alia, to the Atlantic maritime patrol
aircraft, the Transall tactical airlift aircraft, the
Gazelle, Puma and Lynx helicopters and, more
recently, the (Franco-German) Tiger and NH90
helicopters. Last summer, the French and German
Govemments signed the agreement giving the go-
ahead for industrial production 70 of the combat
helicopter, developed by Eurocopter's joint lead
contractor (7 OVo A6rospatiale, 3OVo Dasa).
172. Moreover, Eurocopter is preparing a new
rationalisation plan and defending the European
NH90 troop transport helicopter, threatened by
French budget cuts.
173. The future large aircraft (FLA) which is
among WEAG's projects is intended to equip
WEU forces which need some 350 transport air-
craft. The feasibility study for this aircraft, begun
in October 1993, has recently been completed and
the industrial uurangements are in place. This pro-
gramme 71, regarded as vital for the European
aeronautics indusbry, is nevertheless still far from
becoming a reality 72. Under the pressure of bud-
70. tn other words the availability of industrial facilities
for series production. The two countries are committing
F 2.7 billion to launching industrial production. See Air et
Cosmos, 1526, 7 th July 1995.
71. Its industrial promoters are A6rospatiale, BAe, Casa and
Alenia. Regarding the FLA, see WEU Assembly Document
1484: Mititary airlift-prospects for Europe.
72. At best, the fust aircraft will be available by the end of
2003. See UUsine Nouvelle, 8th June 1995.
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get constraints, France and Itaty have raised the
possibility of deferring its start 73. The industries
of the partner countries are awaiting the agree-
ment of their governments to establish a joint
industrial structure to replace Euroflag; this is
intended as the management structure for the
FLA, development of which is planned for 1996
or 1997.
174. Finally, regarding the thorny problem of
financing the European fighter aircraft oo Euro-
fighter 2000 " (to be built by the United Kingdom,
Germany, Italy and Spain), the German Govern-
ment and Dasa reached a compromise in April
1995. However political problems in Germany are
not the only ones which will have to be resolved
by the Eurofighter consortium 7a. The partners
themselves have differing views on how the work
should be divided between them. As threats recede
and programme costs soar, the countrieso with the
exception of the United Kingdom, have revised
their needs downpards and accordingly reviewed
the division of wof*r
IVWEAG
(a) Aims and operotian
175. The thirteen member countries of the
IEPG 75 are now members of WEAG. With the
exception of Denmark (observer), Norway and
Turkey (associate members), the other countries
are fulImembers of WEU.
176. The objectives of WEAG follow on from
those of the IEPG and complement them; they are:
- 
to strengthen Europe's technological and
industrial base in the defence area;
- 
to ensure the best use of financial
resources through better harmonisation
of operational requirements ;
- 
to improve co-operation in research and
development;
- 
to open up national defence markets to
intemational competition.
177. The branched structure of WEAG (see
Table at Appendix I) involves several levels of
activity and various players. The defence minis-
ters of WEAG member countries are the highest
level in this structure. The NADs, who are res-
ponsible to the ministers, maintain close working
relations with the EDIG, European Defence
Indusffies Group, chaired by Mr.Philippe Girard
73. Defense News, 6th- I 2th and 23rd-29th October I 995.
74. See Financial Times, l6th October 1995.
75. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Tirkey
and the United Kingdom.
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(France). Several organisational structures work
for the NADs, including three panels and the ad
hoc group on the European Armaments Agency.
Each panel submits a progress report to the half-
yearly meetings of the NADs, who themselves
report to the defence ministers. France currently
holds the presidency of WEAG, with Mr. Emile
Blanc 76 as Chairman up to lst January 1997.
178. The armaments secretariat is financed from
the WEAG budget. It is working on the opera-
tional concept approved by the NADs and its prin-
cipal function is to assist the WEAG presidency
and provide appropriate backing for the WEU
Council on armaments matters.
179. Moreover, in its report, the ad hoc group
examined the tasks to be assigned and the prin-
ciples to be applied to the EAA. While recognising
that the conditions for the creation of such an
agency in the broad sense were not yet present,
the NADs nevertheless indicated that it would be
possible, in certain sectors, to achieve more effec-
tive co-operation through a body with specific
legal personality.
180. The half-yearly NADs meetings constitute
the operational level of armaments co-operation
in the framework of WEAG. The two-year rota-
ting presidency has been retained. Relations with
NATO in matters relating to armaments co-opera-
tion accord with the principles decided in Peters-
berg where ministers reaffirmed their conviction
that the Atlantic Alliance was one of the essential
bases of security in Europe.
181. The WEAG staff group 7 is a Council of
WEU armaments working group. It is composed
of the national representatives of the WEAG
NADs and is chaired by the country holding the
WEAG presidency. It deals with all questions
linked to WEAG activities and also prepares
meetings of NADs and defence ministers. Lastly,
it briefs the Council on the activities of WEAG.
182. Essential to the smooth running of the pro-
cess of providing the tools for future European
armaments integration at political, institutional
and industrial levels, consultation between EDIG
- 
which represents twelve countries through their
respective associations 7E 
- 
and WEAG enables
the industry to be associated to some extent with
76. Former Armaments Director-General, former Chairman
and Managing Director of the SNPE and former Chairman of
Gicat.
77. Source: Western European Ar:maments Group, WEU
document 8439, 13th February 1995.
78. Belgium (BDIG), Denmark (Confederation of Indus-
tries), France (CIFEF), Germany @DI), Greece (Confedera-
tion of lndustries), Italy GITAD), Netherlands (NIID), Nor-
way (NHO), Portugal (NID/AIP), Spain (AFARMADE),
Turkey (Sasad) and the United Kingdom (Defence Industries
Council).
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thinking 7e on matters connected with European
amaments co-operation.
183. Besides defending the interests of the
European armaments industry in WEAG, EDIG
is also endeavouring to draw up recommendations
to governments and seeking solutions to the
difficulties of Western European defence indus-
tries.
(b) The work of lhe panels: preparation
of and assislanre in dtcisinn-making
184. The activities of WEAG follow on from
those of the former IEPG panels.
(i) Panel I
185. Panel I's area of responsibility covers the
harmonisation of operational requirements and
co-operation regarding equipment. Your Rap-
porteurs are informed that Panel I's tasks are as
follows:
- 
promote equipment programmes with a
good cost-effectiveness ratio which will
meet the operational needs of WEAG
countries while improving European
defence industry capacity and competitivi-
ty.
- 
Panel I meets as often as necessary and
no less than twice a yea\ the NADs are
regularly informed of its activities and
those of its dependent bodies.
- 
Under the management of the NADs,
Panel I's tasks are as follows:
(a) promote the greatest possible har-
monisation of the operational needs,
progfiunmes and procurement time-
tables of countries in order to lay
down the bases of viable co-opera-
tion programmes;
(b) develop procedures enabling pro-
grarnmes with a high probability of
success to be identified. Such pro-
gmrnmes may lead to the creation of
sub-groups, referred to later, for
developing equipment inside or out-
side the official WEAG structure,
according to decisions taken by the
countries concerned;
79. See EDIG memorandum to the 1996 IGC " The Euro-
pean defence industry. An agenda item for the 1996 intergo-
vernmental conference ". Executive summary, 30th May
1995. This document, which has been agreed by all WEAG
industries and circulated to European authorities and to
govemments, contains recommendations, the most important
of which relate to the harmonisation of operational needs,
harmonisation of procurement procedures... improvements
to structures and terms of co-operation between countries,
support for the technological base.
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(c) act as a consultant to countries seek-
ing partners for specific projects.
The COCO (Co-operation Opporm-
nity Concertation Office) has rec-
ently been created to this end. This
service should enable countries with
similar interests and timetables to be
identified. Panel I also provides an
opinion on the most effective struc-
ture for new projects and conducts a
search throughout WEAG countries
when the necessary information is
not immediately available;
(d) undertake an annual study of the
equipment requirements, timetables
and future procurement programmes
of the member countries, drawing up
a list of equipment replacement
schedules and studying them closely;
(e) transmit in broad outline to the
appropriate authorities information
on WEAG projects so that this
appears in every issue of NATO
ORCAP. The Chairman of WEAG
maintains contact with the NCARC;
(f) undertake further studies or specific
tasks at the request of the NADs;
(g) maintain close relations with Panels
tr and Itr in order to benefit from the
expertise of both whenever the occa-
sion arises. In particular, as necessary,
suggest that Panel I sub-groups use
Panel tr for any research necessary
to their projects and take the results
of research undertaken by Panel Itr
into account, in order to improve the
prospects of participation of coun-
fies with developing defence indus-
tries in joint equipment pro-
grarnmes.
186. Working sub-groups may be established as
necessary in order to implement specific tasks.
These groups arc then given a clear brief and a
fixed time-limit: the progress of their work and
method of operation should be followed very
closely.
187. Ten or so specialised groups have been set
up to study the different possibilities for co-opera-
tion that have been identified, by comparing on an
annual basis the equipment replacement schedules
drawn up by the dffierent countries.
188. Panel I liaises with EDIG (European
Defence Industries Group). Outlines for possible
new projects are sent to it each year after the
meeting for studying equipment.
189. It is desirable for the panel to maintain
close relations with Eurolongterm, Finabel and
with NAIO's lnternational Secretariat. Concepts
formulated by these bodies are examined regularly
and, as necessary, joint discussions are conducted
by Panel I.
Method of operation
190. When an opportunity for co-operation
arises, a specialist group composed of representa-
tives of the countries concemed is formed to carry
out feasibility studies and establish joint opera-
tional specifications with a view to the countries
involved collaborating in the development and pro-
duction phases. Pangl J i-q at gre99{ involved in
seven prograrlmes, including the light attack heli-
copter, the Stinger and Mistral programmes etc.
Specialist sub-groups also exist, some of which are
responsible for particular prograrnmes such as the
FLA (future large aircraft) E0 or the NLV 8'. Initia-
tives are currently directed towards improving the
relationship between services tasked with defining
long-term operational requirements and WEAG.
These efforts should help to increase the number of
projects under co-operative management.
The equipment review meeting
191. The equipment review meeting (ERM),
held each year in June, lies at the heart of Panel I's
activity. The process involves a comparison of the
equipment replacement schedules (ERS) pro-
vided by each of the WEAG nations in order to
identify areas of common requirement.
192. Since the information provided by nations
is sometimes incomplete or inaccurate, it is not
unusual for a number ofprojects to be considered
unviable. Thus it is most important for nations to
ensure every effort is made to provide proper
representation on the ERM.
I93. Moreover it would be useful if the sea,land
and air experts from each country were to attend
each ERM in order to maximise the chances of
success of the projects identified as potentially
viable.
194. Once the ERM has identified a project a sub-
group is formed, consisting of all the nations which
expressed an interest in the project, in order to pur-
sue the matter. The sub-group itseH dictates pro-
gress made from the time of identrfying the project.
195. The sub-groups are invited to submit a
written report to Panel I twice a year and the pro-
ject groups once a year.
196. Insofar as these reports are examined by all
WEAG countries, a desirable outcome may be
that other countries will apply to join a project.
80. A memorandum of understanding on the FLA feasibility
study had been siped in the framework of the IEPG, by the
NADs of the six counfties involved in this programme: France,
Germany, Italy, Porugal, Spain and Tirkey.
8 l. New generation logistical vehicles.
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197. Broadly speaking, the members of a sub-
group are mainly drawn from the services hand-
ling operational requirements and those of a pro-ject group from the military equipment
procurement staffs.
198. There are today eleven subgroups 82 and it
is planned to create an additional one. Only two
have reached the stage of analysing the feasibility
study (Stage 9): the FLA and the MLS.
199. In the early stages of a project, different
views are expressed by countries on operational
needs or specifications and discussions are held
on these points. These consultations may slow
down the process and make it more complex.
2O0. The process for dealing with a project
within a sub-group is negotiated on a case by case
basis. This often involves long and dfficult nego-
tiations.
2Ol. The Chairmen of the project groups agree
the srages of the project but often encounter difflr-
culties in reaching agreement on certain funda-
mental aspects of its managemento such as the
plan structure for a project, the methodology fol-
lowed in scheduling work and the use of manage-
ment tools. Consequently much time is lost in
explaining the various possible procedures.
Conversely, sub-group members reach agreement
more easily on the requiremenls of headquarters,
whose procedures are relatively similar in most
member countries.
202. Funding practices differ from one country
to another; it may prove dfficult to plan as far
ahead as may be necessary. Certain countries
adopt relatively stable plans ten years in advance,
while others work on an annual basis and are
unable to draw up frm plans or engage in com-
mitments beyond that time span.
203. It is therefore for the Chairman of the sub-
group to find a middle road between the dffierent
systems in order to satisfy everyone. This inev-
itably means compromise by most, if not all coun-
tries, which sometimes have to refer to their natio-
nal authorities to obtain agreement on initiatives
that do not correspond to their normal, recognised
practice.
2M. Defence equipment procurement policies
vary considerably from one country to another
and these differences must be identified in each
group as quickly as possible.
205. In particular, financing and approval proce-
dures differ from the point of view of timetable;
82. FlA,/future large aircraft lMlS/microwave landing sys-
tem; AGl/automatic grenade launcher; NLV/new logistics
vehicles; SAT/short-range anti-tank weapons; PDWfuersonal
defence weapons; CSS/combat support ship; MIIWmine-
sweeperc 
- 
influence mechanical sweeping; OSV/oversnow
vehicles.
very detailed planning is therefore necessary to
allow each country the time necessary to imple-
ment its own procedures.
206. The progress of sub-groups is measured by
the " milestones " reached. Should too little, or no
progress at dl, be made towards the next mile-
stone, Panel I may decide to disband the sub-
goup at one of its bi-annual meetings. There is a
list of milestones for reference as follows:
- 
Panel I: initiation of proposal for sub-
group to be formed (stemming from dis-
cussions on ERS);
- 
Nominated nations: establish common
need between those nations interested
and confirm to Panel I that the group will
be formed.
207. The sub-group:
- 
formulates concepts and evaluates mis-
sion needs. A mission need document(MND) may be produced. Concept for-
mulation may constitute the initial phase
in the life-cycle of a project and generally
covers the period from the time the idea
to set up a project is conceived to an ini-
tial formal decision on user needs. Fac-
tors contributing to the emergence of an
idea for a project vary but may include:
- 
a change in policy requiring new
capability;
- 
the identification of a new actual or
potential requirement;
- 
replacement of an obsolescent system
or an advance in technology;
- 
work being done on an existing pro-
ject that stimulates the idea for its suc-
cessor, or some new utilisation, etc... ;
- 
undertakes the preliminary, prefeasibi-
lity study, which may lead to an outline
European stafftarget (OEST). This study
establishes the starting point for the pro-ject and determines early estimates of
time and cost. During concept formula-
tion, close liaison is established between
all interested parties. On the basis of
their advice, the sponsor decides whether
to approve the project moving into the
feasibility phase;
- 
drafts a European staff target (EST) for
the outline system specification (OSS);
- 
obtains the endorsement of the various
countries and WEAG for the staff
target;
- 
proceeds to the feasibility study. An out-
line specification is normally developed
during the feasibility study. The outline
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specification establishes the baseline for
the technical specification and specifies
performance requirements. The prime
aims of the feasibility study are to establish
technical feasibility and provide estimates
of cost, duration and impact on incremen-
tal revenues and profits. Failure to identify
inherent deficiencies in a project concept
at this stage can have far-reaching adverse
effects in later phases. The output of the
feasibility study is a report;
- 
analyses the feasibility study report;
- 
drafts the European staff requirement
(ESR) leading to definition of the system
specification. These needs and specifica-
tions are subsequently endorsed by the
nations and WEAG;
- 
engages in project definition (PD) the
objectives of which are to:
- 
verify scientific and technical
approaches identified during concept
formulation and feasibility and risks
and problems to be overcome in deve-
lopment;
- 
analyse performances, cost, time and
sales potential and establish a satisfac-
tory balance between these factors;
- 
finalise the agreed characteristics of
the equipment;
- 
develop the specifications and provide
realistic estimates of the cost and dura-
tion of the development programme
and an estimate of the current cost of
the equipment in production. Planning
the production phase is a key part of
the project definition and full develop-
ment phases. This is essential to en-
sure a smooth transition from devel-
opment to production;
- 
develop proposals for procurement
strategy. Procurement specifications
are then studied and defined; (includ-
ing the establishment of firm prices or
any other measure for initiating large-
scale development);
- 
ca:ries out user trials;
- 
obtains national and international
approval;
- 
defines the aims of the European project
office (EPO);
- 
moves to deployment, at which stage a
decision must be made on the continued
existence of the sub-group which may be
until production is complete. European
in-service goals (EISEG) and national
disengagement intentions (NADI) are
then examined.
208. Sub-groups are required to report, in writ-
ing, to Panel I twice each year and project groups
once each year.
209. When a project has progressed to the point
where the requirement and funding are agreed
between the countries concerned the sub-group is
than designated as a project group. There are
seven projects at present. They have gone beyond
the feasibility phase and arc in either the develop-
ment or the production phase. Three projects have
reached milestone 17 (production and European
production objective): the Stinger, the Mistral and
the project for producing compatible munitions
for the 155 mm M-483M-864 howitzers.
2lO. The harmonisation of needs is one of the
basic questions on which progress is very slow,
which hinders the work of Panel I. The needs of
Western Europe's armed forces are not basically
different. Simplified in the extreme, the scenarios
described in the documents which outline require-
ments 
- 
such as the white papers of France, Ger-
many, the United Kingdom and even of Italy and
Spain 
- 
raise two possibilities: the defence of
national territory against major aggression and
limited intervention abroad. However, national
planning and programming procedures differ
from one country to another. This situation creates
incompatibilities in timetables which are particu-
larly awkward todeal with.
2ll. Given the discrepancies between the politi-
cal, economic and budgetary thinking of the
various countries, it is obviously premature to
envisage European programming s:. ro German
and United Kingdom planning are systematic and
far more structured than French programming . In
France, pro$amming is more " political " than in
Germany or the United Kingdom where planning
is directly linked to the budget cycle and in fact
is more " technical ". Since 1980, France has re-
viewed its programming with each change of
government. Moreover, Germany has a rolling
prograrnme as does the United Kingdom, with an
update every three years. In Franceo however,
since the mid-80s, an update has been envisaged
on a three-yearly basis.
212. [t should in fact be possible to achieve a
minimum of co-ordination. [n a]l these countries
the joint services staff commiffee is responsible
for this work. Their timescale is basically the
same in France and Germany (5 to 6 years looking
15 years ahead).
213. As a certain number of players involved
have proposed, it would be interesting for WEAG
to reflect on ways of achieving the target of a ten-
year rolling prograrnme for equipping European
83. See " La programmation militaire en Allemagne et au
Royaume-Uni ", L'Arrnement, No. 43, July-August 1994,
pagel07.
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armed forces, at least as far as main programming
is concerned. As to programming itself, it would
nevertheless be necessary for co-operation to be
based on firmer commitments than the present
exercises implemented by WEAG, such as the
equipment replacement schedule, involving juxta-
position without any tying in.
214. More liberal states might see in this pro-
posal for European programming an initiative to
achieve market transparency, while the more cen-
tralised among them might interpret it as co-
ordinated programming.
215. The idea has even been put forward by
some that this programming exercise might go
hand in hand with a white paper on European
defence, identifying threats to and common
interests of the partners involved, and also with a
decision in principle to co-operate, except in
cases of manifest impossibility, in all pro-
grammes above a certain cost limit. This deci-
sion would constitute recognition that there
would in future be no major national armaments
progmmmes.
(ii) Panel II
216. Panel II's tasks are to strengthen the posi-
tion of Europeans in defence and research technol-
ogy. Sharing research costs is in fact becoming
increasingly essential because of the exponential
costs of developing technologies and cuts in
defence budgets. Besides management of the
EUCLID programme @uropean co-operation for
the long term in defence) in which industry and
research institutes participate, the panel's activi-
ties include defining CEPAs (common European
priority areas), organising research and techno-
logy projects (R&T) in each CEPA and co-ordina-
tion and monitoring of research and technological
projects (RTP). EUCLID is the only European
military programme for co-operation in research
and technology. It aims to pool research funds (in
order to reduce duplication to the minimum), to
increase the funding available for research pro-jects and, lastly, to prepare for the armaments
Europe of the future.
217. A memorandum of understanding
(P-MOLI) signed on 16th November 1990 defines
the working methods of the EUCLID programme:
keeping an up-to-date list of CEPAs and setting
up, within each CEPA s, research and technology
projects developed in anticipation of future equip-
ment requirements.
218. The results of the EUCLID programme
have been mixed. After a relatively slow start,
84. There are currently 15 CEPAs: for example CEPA I
deals with modem radar technology, CEPA 2 with microelec-
ronics, CEPA 9 wittr satellite surveillance technology, CEPA 10
with underwater detection and related technology, etc.
EUCLID has developed a firm base: work is
going on in thirteen CEPAs,49 current research
and technology projects have been approved by
Panel II and,29 contracts, worth 210 MECUs in
total, have been notified. However, at present
EUCLID is stagnating at around 60 MECUs per
annum, considerably less than the target of 120
MECUs per annum fixed by the defence minis-
ters in 1990. There are two main reasons for this
shortfall: frst, the scarcity ofnew proposals for
research and technology projects put forward by
the CEPA steering committees and, second, the
long time scales, even though these have been
considerably reduced. Moreover, the impossibi-
lity, in the present state of European defence
consultation, of identifying budgets to be alloca-
ted to the various CEPAs also explains why par-
ticipation is on a piecemeal basis rather than
based on joint funding. This is a structure that is
frequently criticised, particularly for bringing in
too many countries 85, and today it is coming up
against strong competition E6 from bilateral co-
operation, which is easier to manage E7.
219. Nevertheless one positive development is
emerging. Until now EUCLID has operated on
the principle of voluntary contributions from each
nation. Major progress was achieved recently
with the establishment of a Research Cell 88 within
WEAG (CRC, Step 1), composed of 7 people and
operational since May 1995. The cell and the
Armaments Secretariat form an enlarged secreta-
riat. Located in Brussels, administratively it
comes under the political division of WEU. It
reports directly to Panel tr and to the Research
and Technology Management Committee(RTMC) for all operational matters. The cell
seeks to improve the efficiency of the EUCLID
programme in order to encourage the creation of
new projects. It has the task ofproviding leader-
ship in EUCLID structures such as the CEPA stee-
ring committees and the RTP management
groups. This is an interesting deparnre in as much
that the CEPA Steering Committees are respon-
sible for proposing new RTPs to the Panel.
Moreover the RTP management groups play an
essential r6le in reducing the time involved in pla-
cing contracts.
85. When there are more than four partners in a project
serious difficulties often emerge relating, for example, to the
end use of results.
86. According to Xavier Lebacq, EUCLID co-ordinator for
France, ovetT0Vo ofEuropean co-operation is bilateral and
involves France, Germany and the United Kingdom. (INFO
DGA, No. 76, September l995,page24.
87. See " Armaments Europe forced to succeed ", Info,
DGA op.cit.
88. The decision to create this cell was taken by ministers in
November 1994; staff appointments were approved by the
Council in March 1995.
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220. The establishment of a permanent body
supporting co-operation in research among
WEAG countries testifies to the importance of a
programme such as EUCLID 8e. According to the
former Chairman of Panel tr, this frst stage in the
harmonisation of European endeavours in up-
stream studies gives WEU a capability which
NATO does not have.
221. On a proposal from Panel II, the NADs
have decided on several measures which should
help to strengthen the EUCLID programme m :
- 
the decision in principle to give the
Research Cell greater autonomy, after
a probationary period, by granting it
the status of subsidiary organ of WEU
planned for the European Armaments
Agency (CRC Step 2, which envisages
the establishment of a system for placing
conffacts and following them up is sche-
duled for 1996)";
- 
the recommendation to take account, in
the EUCLID research programme, of
topics developed in other co-operation
frameworks that exist between WEAG
countries;
- 
the approval of the Eurofinder procedure
allowing unsolicited proposals to be
taken into account in the programme,
emanating from consortia submitting
technological co-operation bids. More-
over it was decided to hold an initial
Eurofinder seminar in March 1966. The
Eurofinder mechanism which should
become operational after that date allows
for the development of EUCLID. It
would be desirable, once it has an inde-
pendent budget, for the EUCLID Cell to
implement a research and development
plan drawn up in accordance with
expressed military needs which should
be institutionalised, outside the present
area of responsibility of the WEU Plan-
ning Cell or the Eurolongterm sub-
group.The latter aims to promote effec-
tive long-term military planning but its
very limited brief should be extended to
enable it to define its military needs.
222. Among the important achievements of the
EUCLID programme, besides the research
conffacts in progress, mention should be made of
the close relations established in recent years bet-
89. Dr. Emst A. van Hoek, Chairman of WEAG Panel tr.
Introduction, WEAG Research News, No. 1, 15th September
1995.
90. Victor Margais, in the periodic letter from the EUCLID
National Co-ordinator, No. 6, DGA, March 1995.
91. A decision is to be taken by the NADs in late 1995.
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ween those with responsibility for defence research
at the level of both government and industry.
223. Contacts between Panel II and the EDIG
have also increased and greater trust has been
established. These contacts led to the first
EUCLID symposium being held in The Hague in
November 1994"'.
224. Moreover, the NADs have agreed to examine
the feasibility of the study proposed by the EDIG
with a view to identifying technological priorities
for the defence of WEAG countries.
225. Work still remains to be done, particularly
regarding convergence between government labo-
ratories, to which EUCLID procedures are ill-adap-
ted. A framework memorandum of understanding
(MOU), which takes up the former TA/CTP provi-
sions used by the steering committees and manage-
ment groups, adapting them to make them more
effective, is in preparation. It should be submitted
to ministers of defence for approval at their
November 1995 meeting in Madrid.
226. Victor Margais, a former Chairman of
WEAG Panel II, wishes those responsible for
research policies in WEAG countries to be more
adventurous, while national incentive measures are
proving necessary for achieving the EUCLID pro-
gramme. He also invites the Chairmen and mem-
bers of the CEPA steering committees and the rele-
vant industrial groups to be more imaginative in
bringing forward new research projects (RTP).
227. Panel tr has formed a joint working group
ooPanel tr/Panel I " to prepare the Research Cell's
move to the second stage. This working group is
to work out rules for placing contracts and study
the corresponding terms of payment, in accordance
with the rules for placing contracts of the WEU
subsidiary organs and with the charter of the future
European Armaments Agency, currently in prepa-
ration.
(iii) Panel III
Areas of expertise
228. Panel III's area of responsibility concerns
the broad outlines of a common policy on defence
economics and armaments co-operation. In recent
years its task has been to develop principles and
procedures applicable to creating and opening up
a European defence equipment market (EDEM).
The specific topics e3 for which Panel III is res-
92. This was attended by 350 govemment representatives,
military personnel, researchers, industrialists, joumalists and
scientists from all the WEAG countries. Expressing its satis-
faction, the EDIG supported the idea of a second symposium.
This is planned for late 1996.
93. Among these are the proposals drawn up in 1988 in the
plan of action adopted by the ministers of defence of IEPG
countries which completed the Vredling report " Towards a
stronger Europe ".
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ponsible include intemational competition, visibi-
lity of needs, the application of fair return and a
number of provisions such as exchanges of infor-
mation on suppliers, co-ordination of procedures
for calls for tenders, common criteria for the
award of conffacts, technology ffansfer, backing
for countries with developing defence industries
(DDD s. These objectives have not yet progressed
beyond the stage of highly theoretical declara-
tions of intent.
229. A number of questions are under discussion
among the countries participating in the various
Panel Itr sub-groups. This work has given rise to
proposals and conclusions which are examined by
the Panel and which, if approved, are submitted to
the NADs.
Countries with developing defence industries(DDI countries)
230. Sub-group 7 is tasked with studying the
introduction of support measures for the devel-
oping defence industries (DDIs) of three coun-
tries: Greece, Portugal and Turkey. To this end, in
November 1993, the WEAG defence ministers
approved a document prepared by the Portuguese
presidency which proposed " guidelines " and
" detailed measures ". The repeated absence of
Turkey from the working group meetings in ques-
tion hindered the group in pursuing its work effec-
tively.
231. Greece es has recently taken over from Por-
rugal the chairmanship of Sub-group 7, which,
since its creation in 1987 has been successively
chaired by Greece, Turkey and Portugal for two
and a half years.
232. The topics dealt with in this sub-group are
specifically:
- 
identification of the capabilities of DDI
countries necessary for maintaining mili-
tary equipment and " niche " production.
In particular, this involves determining
sectors and/or niches regarded as
promising for DDI countries in the
context of maintaining Europe's defence
technology and industrial base;
- 
procurement support to DDI countries.
In this area, these countries question the
lack of information from which their
defence industries suffer regarding the
procurement programmes of countries
that do not belong to this group.
233. Furthermore a document on the " detailed
mqmures " provided for the introduction of speci-
fic support from non-DDI country firms, which
Such as Greece, Portugal and T[rkey.
Under the presidency of Dr. Evangelou.
should organise better co-operation in research,
development, production and staff fraining.
234. The Sub-group on contract regulations and
procedures for the European Armaments Agency
is tasked with establishing the ten principles
applying to armarnents procurement in the Euro-
pean Armaments Agency. Consensus has not been
achieved on the principles relating to dispute
settlement and support for the defence industry
and technology base either in the sub-group or
within the framework of Panel III, a point to
which we shall return.
The defence industry and technology base
235. WEAG's aim to promote and develop co-
operation between member countries implies the
existence of a favourable defence industry envi-
ronment. The defence industrial base is shrinking,
in particular because of the almost universal
reductions in European defence budgets. The
urgency of maintaining this base has led WEAG,
in the framework of Panel I, to concem itself with
this matter. The DITB sub-group is in fact study-
ing those aspects of the defence economy of the
WEAG countries which relate to security. It
includes representatives of the most important
countries in the armaments field (France, the Uni-
ted Kingdom, Germany and ltaly) and also other
countries such as Portugal and Norway. This
working group aims to give substance to the eco-
nomic security concept of European defence, dis-
cussed by the WEAG defence ministers at their
informal meeting on23rd March 1995. It has
moreover identified several subjects for further
discussion, among them reduction of overcapa-
city, security of supplies and financing for research
and development by transnational companies.
The group has drawn up a document on the
establishment of a defence industry and techno-
logy base (Which collective building of a Euro-
pean DITB), approved by Panel tr in 1995. The
DITB sub-group is undeniably a major success of
the WEAG's French presidency.
236. On the basis of a questionnaire circulated to
all WEAG members and to the EDIG, the DITB
sub-group compiled a summary document giving
an overview of countries' positions. For example
it highlighted the fact that competition was the
most awkward problem. Moreover, it showed that
there was general agreement in thinking that it
was essential to maintain existing design and pro-
duction skills.
The DITB sub-group
237. The DITB sub-group stressed that the
conditions now existed in Europe for creating a
true defence industrial base (from research and
development to testing and maintenance).
94.
95.
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238. However, despite the progress achieved in
certain areas, it is necessary to find synergies
between the fragmented indusrial bases and reduce
excess capacity. This need is largely accepted by
WEAG countries. The analysis carried out by the
sub-group furthermore indicates that the Euro-
pean defence industry would become more effi-
cient and productive if competition and co-opera-
tion were developed in WEAG. Once it had
become competitive, it might in the future compete
or collaborate with the American industry.
239. Yet several questions are still under discus-
sion in this connection:
- 
the problem of competition is often
viewed as a matter of principle; the open-
ing up of markets on a competitive basis
presupposes a preliminary restructuring,
while competition is often regarded as
contrary to industry consolidation and
work-sharing, whereas it would probably
help to maintain the defence industry in
Europe;
- 
positions regarding the United States
fluctuate between those that feel threate-
ned by the prospect of potential retalia-
tion, those that regard the United States
as a defence equipment and technology
supplier offering good value for money
and those that do not wish to compromi-
se their opportunities for subsequent com-
petition berween future European and pre-
sent American monopolies.
240. A degree of European solidarity is never-
theless proving very useful in enabling European
countries to rival the United States and other
countries. But rather than develop a form of Euro-
pean preference which requires that all member
countries be convinced that this preference will be
in their long-term interest, there is a preference for
trying to have the " Buy American " legislation
abolished along with other obstacles to reciprocal
market access, which seems a pious hope at the
present juncture.
24I. Lastly, the various national comments on
the questionnaire indicate that there is still some
way to go before consensus is reached on the
issues raised. Some governments rely heavily on
market forces while others favour altemative poli-
cies to improve the situation of the European
defence industry. A positive approach does how-
ever emerge with increasing recognition of the
need to establish a common defence equipment
base. Such a base could collaborate on an equal
footing with the American industry and compete
with it in world markets.
242. The topics developed by the DITB sub-
group are the following:
l. Research, development and testing
243. The panel is divided between countries
which make a clear distinction between national
defence and security needs (in the wider sense 
-
in other words including economic and social
aspects) in critical technologies, generally limited
to poles of excellence or specffic characteristics of
their defence posture, and the defence and security
of Europe (to be determined on the basis of a com-
mon European defence policy encompassing the
whole spectrum of research and development)
and the others which make no distinction between
these concepts.
2M. Nevertheless, it is widely considered that
Europe must aim at developing capabilities across
the full spectrum of technologies, that emphasis
should be put on elecftonics and information tech-
nologies, new materials and stealth, that research
systems should be supported and that EDIG has a
r6le to play through its studies and proposals.
245. The industry considers that a dialogue
between governments is necessary to determine
critical technologies in the long and medium term.
This means that strong co-ordination between
governments and indusffies must be developed.
The most critical technologies must also be
known for govemments to spend money appro-
priately and for industry to invest accordingly.
Firms also consider that government funding for
research and development is more essential than
ever. Indusfiry can contribute to this effort only if
production programmes allow it to recover its
investment in technology.
246. The evolution of the industry towards dual-
use technology is welcomed by countries and
should be extended across the entire range of
technologies. However this trend is obviously
viewed as a means of taking advantage of the best
commercial infrastructures and products and
applying them to military uses. Promising fields
are numerous. European Union funding would be
useful in critical technology sectors insofar as the
military will be increasingly linked to civilian
dual-use technologies.
247 . For EDIG, dual use is not a clear concept: it
can be misused. Specific developments are fre-
quently requested which are not profitable for the
companies nor for the governments. But EDIG
allows that there is a linkage between military and
civil applications at the level of products which
can be cost effective if these products are to be
used as they are. For industry, it is theoofunded "
transfer from the military to the civilian which is
promising as a means of preserving high techno-
logy.
248. Most countries asked think that WEAG
provides a useful forum for exchanges and to
avoid gaps in the European technological base. In
the future WEAG nations may find ways of
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improving European co-operation, for instance by
concentrating research efforts and resources in
specific fields between govemments on a recipro-
cal mutually reliant basis.
249. This will be enhanced by transnational
restructuring. The sub-group suggests that indus-
try should be free to choose the fields in which to
invest and whom to co-operate with. But, for
EDIG and a few countries, more co-ordination
between govemments is requested. Furthermore,
governments should help indusfiry to concenffate
more on military priorities and future programmes.
250. Countries generally consider that rather
than maintain expertise artificially, except in stra-
tegically essential sectors, it is better to meet
requirements through the intermediary of compe-
tition. [t is the responsibility of firms to choose in
which areas they should be involved and be com-
petitive; they have to design and produce items
which are competitive and marketable.
251. For EDIG, maintaining these competences
is a priority which is shared by states. Some
consequently admit the need for public funding
through policies promoting prototypes and tech-
nology demonstrators.
252. Concerning the existing test centres in
Europe and the need to harmonise and co-ordinate
national investment policies in that field, coun-
tries have a very positive approach. It is a matter
of avoiding redundant capacities, trying to agrce
on equipment requirements and then specialising
test centres and opening them to different cus-
tomers. The question is generally handled by the
WEAG Panel tr subgroup on test facilities.
2. Procurement principle s
253. Regarding harmonised procurement rules
in Europe and ways of achieving this, the whole
spectrum of positions is noticeable among states.
Some believe compulsory joint rules are needed,
others speak of desirability. Yet others admit that
harmonisation would be a major improvement but
remains a long way off or is desirable and neces-
sary to achieve fair and equitable treatment of
suppliers while others think that harmonised pro-
curement rules improve competitive procurement
conditions.
254. In any event, WEAG is widely considered
an appropriate forum for working out proposals
for procurement regulations.
255. The increase in the level of reciprocal pur-
chasing is generally welcomed by states, the more
so as it has been a major goal of WEAG these last
years. This is also considered as a means of up
grading the capabilities of smaller countries and
implementing WEAG rules on competition. But
no new practical solution has been brought for-
ward apart from the abolition of non-tariffbarriers.
256. On how to make distinctions between the
fields where competition is undoubtedly positive
and where it is defimental to the preservation of
long-term manufacturing interests, positions vary
befween:
- 
countries which do not accept such a dis-
tinction because for them competition is
always positive insofar as it offers minis-
tries of defence best value for money and
encourages industry to resffucture and
develop its efficiency to achieve better
positions in the world market; this is
wholeheartly the position of the United
Kingdom, an enthusiast when it comes to
best value for money;
- 
countries which consider that competi-
tion might be counterproductive for the
production of main weapon systems but
that it should be mandatory for sub-
systems;
- 
countries which believe that one should
differentiate between categories of
equipment. They seek to avoid the
constitution of world monopolies by
trying not to jeopardise the European
defence technology and industry base.
257. According to the DITB subgroup, these
must not be viewed as antagonistic positions.
Pragmatism is in fact the rule: if competition is
usually positive, there are cases where, for natio-
nal or European security reasons, govemments
wish to maintain either national capability or speci-
fic industrial monopoly.
3. Production, madernisation and mnintennnce
258. In short, it is accepted that cost efficiency is
required, competition is advocated and resffuctur-
ing and consotdation is the specific responsibility
of industry within a free market environment
without government involvement or subsidies.
259. Nearly all countries believe that the moti-
vation is not to sustain declining business to
improve efficiency and productivity. The opposi-
tion, if any, is between those who believe that
ministries of defence remain a customer of indus-
try rather than its sponsor, and those who think
that armaments activity is an essential matter for
defence policy and economic security and there-
fore requiring active government involvement,
especially as far as the health of the industry and
research and development funding are concemed.
Nevertheless a wide consensus exists to consider
this issue as a fundamental one.
4. Industrial restructuring
260. When considering whether overcapacities
should be reduced at the European level and
which players should have responsibility for
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restructuring defence industries, states mainly
view this as the business and responsibility of the
industry through consolidation, rationalisation
and diversification, relying upon the market
forces to stimulate reductions.
261. Some countries consider that no govern-
ment guarantee is required, because compensa-
tions and subsidies are considered to be distorting
and to postpone the necessary decisions. On the
other hand some consider that there is a need for
co-ordination and concertation between govem-
ments and industries to keep an acceptable level
of production in critical defence sectors and to
minimise subsequent adverse labour and eco-
nomic effects.
262. EDIG is of the opinion that overcapacities
have to be reduced for commercial stability. The
existence of a fully open and fair European iefen-
ce equipment market will then ensure that normal
market trading arrangement will encourage the
restructuring changes necessary.
263. EDIG is also of the opinion that national
policies must be harmonised. Governments must
promote the fundamental home base in those
defence industrial technologies which are essen-
tial to the conduct of government business.
264. A large consensus among countries appears
to be that in the field of restructurinB, govern-
ments should provide, to the maximum extent
possible, advice and information about future
market requirements, and plans for procurements;
at the European level, guarantee of supply of
whatever type of equipment should be secured;
the goal is the creation of a sound, future-oriented
industrial base.
265. In terms of preserving innovation and
expertise in the frame of restructuring, states atrach
extreme importance to the issue of key techno-
logies (either dual-use or purely military).
5.The needto gofurther
266. It is now time to consider a rational demar-
cation for the European DruB. Several types of
criteria govem such delimitation:
- 
political and military criteria; it is neces-
sary to identify a common core of
requirements regarded by all countries as
having priority (for example: air trans-
port, satellite intelligence capability,
long- and medium-range airborne
weapons etc.) and equipment able to
meet these requirements;
the technological and financial " ba:rier
to entry "; there is a need to identify mili-
tary equipment with a high research and
development content which European
states could not abandon without risk of
becoming excessively dependent on the
United States (for example, combat air-
craft);
- 
lastly, commercial availability; it is
necessary to know the actual number of
suppliers and their reliability.
267. In view of the analysis of the European
DITB in the previous chapter, it is necessary to
envisage an overall reaction taking into account
both demand (evolution towards a common defi-
nition of requirements) and supply (industrial
restructuring and strengthening scientific and
technological capability). On the demand side,
one stage in the evolution of doctrine will be the
drafting of a European defence white paper,
approved by WEAG defence ministers and speci-
fically providing a regular assessment of the
scientific and technological capabilities of defen-
ce industries in Europe. This would be an impor-
tant reference in terms of the evolution of national
defence budgets and would facilitate prograrnmes
of common interest. Establishing a Commiffee of
Chiefs-of-Staff assisted by project offrces for each
type of weapon and in contact with a European
Armaments Agency would create the link bet-
ween requirements and procurement.
268. On the supply side, priority should be given
to operations for horizontal integration of the
defence industries in Europe. In this area, the
competition policy of the European Union might
provide a suitable framework, on condition,
however, that account is taken of the specific
nature of the armaments sector and the global
competition criterion (international and no longer
merely European). Moreover, it might prove
interesting to conceive of a form of interface
between European Union research programmes
and military research programmes. Such an
approach would however imply that the thorny
problem of confidentiality was resolved. Further-
more, real co-ordination between national cenfies
of expertise and testing would be useful in main-
taining the defence industry and technology base
in Europe. The group of measures relating to sup-
ply would inevitably lead to geographic concen-
trations and industrial regrouping in Europe.
269. Finally, acknowledgement is necessary of
the fact that, although not present in all WEAG
countries, the DITB is essential for the security of
these countries as a whole. Maintaining it and
strengthening it consequently imply a com-
mitment to collective responsibility by all, even
the smaller countries with only a very limited
industrial capacity. This contribution inevitably
raises the question of such counffies' right to be
involved in the conduct of operations, the ways
and means and extent of which have yet to be
determined.
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V The Earopean Armnments Agency (EAA)
(a) General
(i) Major reasons for creating a European Arma-
ments Agency (EAA)
270. A European alTnaments agency should be
able to contribute actively to Europe's military
independence. In this connection the high-level
group of experts on the CFSP stresses in its initial
report that without an adequate combination of
diplomacy and force projection capability there
cannot be a credible CFSP s. This political objec-
tive requires an effort of will on the part of
WEAG member states, without which the future
agency might be reduced to a mere central procu-
rement unit to which the founder members turn
only to initiate programmes without the long-term
vision that is essential if there is to be lasting auto-
nomy in defence matters. Such autonomy will
have real meaning only to the extent that skills
and know-how are preserved in areas considered
to be essential. As in the United States, which, for
budgetary reasons is planning to limit some of its
programmes to the development phase, indepen-
dence at European level will also depend on mas-
tery oftechnology.
271. This agency should help to reduce financial
requirements. Financial straitjackets are tighte-
ning around European economies and other prio-
rities now compete with the defence effort. The
international political-military context which
emerged from the cold war is tightening budgetary
constraints which are accompanied by an expo-
nential increase in the cost of armaments. Conse-
quently cost stabilisation or reduction will be one
of the priority aims of the future agency. Research
cannot be cut back without damaging the prin-
ciple of independence. This observation implies
choices which will mean preserving only the
essential, using existing expertise and, where pos-
sible, preventing centres of expertise arising
without good reason in non-priority areas.
272. Moreover, new considerations are likely to
be necessary when deciding to launch an arma-
ments programme; frst, the same types of pro-
grarnme can no longer co-exist; second, military,
political and industrial leaders will have to avoid
co-operation leading to overlapping structures
and longer delays 
- 
both factors which generate
additional costs. These aims are directed in parti-
cular towards improving the competitivity of the
European defence industry as compared with that
of the United States.
96. See: European security policy towards 2000: ways and
means to establish genuine credibility; high-level group of
experts on the CFSP, initial report, prepared at the request of
Commissioner H. van den Broek, in his capacity as DGI of
the European Commission.
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273. Lastly, an agency must be able to guarantee
operational perfomrance and interoperability. The
decision to make multinational units available to
WEU (the Anglo-Dutch amphibious force, the
multinational airborne division, EUROFOR,
EUROMARFOR) in combination with the
CJTF the strengthening of the European Corps
which is to become operational in 1995, along
with other initiatives relating to joint forces and/or
headquarters make efforts to achieve interopera-
bility more necessary than ever, with a view to
creating the conditions for future standardisation
of equipment. The agency should enable the ques-
tion of standards, logistical support, specifica-
tions, development methods and means of pro-
duction to be dealt with jointly.
274. The definition of such an agency cannot be
undertaken without taking account of existing
national or European state structures, the arma-
ments policies of WEAG members and the situa-
tion of the defence industry in Europe. The
aspects referred to are in fact among the para-
meters for defining programme management
structures in the framework of the agency', as
are also relations between the United States and
Europe.
275. The defence equipment procurement poli-
cies and frameworks established eE differ from
country to country in WEAG. These divergencies
are undoubtedly obstacles to the decision to co-
operate and are partly at the root of the difficulties
encountered in conducting operations, both at the
level of research and development and of mana-
ging armaments programmes. If, in the present
state of affairs, these peculiarities cannot realisti-
cally be eliminated, efforts must nevertheless be
concentrated, inter alia, on achieving closer
convergence between the armaments potcies and
structures of the countries concerned. There are
moreover several factors favourable to building
an armaments Europe:
- 
by ratifying the Maastricht Treaty, the
countries of the European Union, ten of
them WEAG members, accepted an
undertaking and the responsibility of
establishing a CFSP which is to lead to a
common defence, at the service of apoli-
tical Europe. The work ca:ried out in the
framework of the CFSR WEU and espe-
cially WEAG, although limited and
inadequate, helps to create conditions
that are more favourable to the emergence
of a European security and defence
identity;
97. See " Vers une,Agence Europdenne d'armement ",
Centre des Hautes Etudes de I'armement, 29th Session,
phase strat€gie, May 1993.
98. See Chapter [V: Armaments procurement and situation
of the defence industry in Europe.
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- 
whatever the procedures of their procu-
rement policies (off+he-shelf procure-
ment, with trade-offs, or independent
development of their defence equip-
ment) countries are moved, inter alia, by
the same ambition, 
- 
i.e. to acquire high
technology know-how;
- 
the countries concerned are progres-
sively moving out of defence businesses
and increasingly are encouraging com-
petition and some forms of free trade;
- 
the generalisation of the notion of project
work through national or multinational
tearns brought together within agencies
serves to encourage co-operation.
276. In the face of these major factors likely to
lead to the convergence of states' positions on
defence equipment procurement, the differences
identified between local structures appear to be
obstacles that can be overcome.
(ii) An integrated project for building Europe
277. In 1991, in the negotiations on the Treaty
on European Union, the French and German
Govemments relaunched the debate on the Euro-
pean Armaments Agency. Their proposal was for
the creation of a WEU agency for armaments co-
operation. The Maastricht Treaty explicitly raised
the prospect of establishing a European Arma-
ments Agency (EAA). The declaration by the
WEU member countries, annexed to the treaty,
stated that proposals regarding the operational
r6le of WEU " particularly enhanced co-operation
in the field of armaments with the aim of creating
a European armaments agency ". Later, the
Petersberg declaration of June 1992 provided in
particular that WEU and IEPG experts would
undertake an initial examination of the r61e and
functions of a possible EAA. In March 1993, the
NADs decided to create an ad-hoc working group
in WEAG in order to study all questions relating
to the creation of the agency and to analyse its tasks.
(iii) The WEAG ad hoc group on the EAA
(The principles guiding the discussions of the ad
hoc group; the work of the ad hoc group)
278. In its first report dated September 1993,
approved by the NADS in March 1993, the ad hoc
group concluded that conditions did not at present
exist for the creation of an agency conducting the
full range of procurement activities on behalf of
WEAG member nations, but noted that there
might be potential in individual areas for impro-
vements to be made in the conduct of co-operati-
ve business through the mechanism of a body
having a legal personality. It is regrettable that
from the outset the conclusions of this study
group were luke-warm and its proposals not parti-
cularly ambitious.
279. At their October 1993 meeting, the NADs
tasked the AHSG to consider the structure and
legal status for such an agency, a detailed descrip-
tion of its tasks and funding, its relationship with
the WEAG panels on the one hand and with the
European Community and NAIO on the other.
This work led to a second report dated September
1994. ln parallel with the Panel tr report on the
creation of a research cell, the second report of the
AHSG also envisaged the necessary organisa-
tional arrangements for establishing this cell. A
third report in September 1995 sets out the
conclusions ofthe ad hoc group on the charter and
general memorandum of understanding, on the
Western European Armaments Organisation
(WEAO) and the European project offices.
280. Several principles have guided the discus-
sions of the group since its creation. These are:
- 
continuing pressure for value for money
in defence procurement decisions; the
group should be able to demonstrate that
added value is to be expected from any
new arrangements in the framework of
activities taken over by the EAA. There
should be no duplication of existing co-
operative arrangements ;
- 
in accordance with the principles agreed
for the incorporation of IEPG into WEU,
any decision must have the full support
of all members of WEAG whether or not
they are full members of WEU;
- 
any arrangements should ensure the full
responsibility of the NADs;
- 
any arrangements proposed should be
consistent with the aim of developing an
open European defence equipment mar-
ket (EDEM) and should contribute to
that objective.
(b) The European Armaments Agency:
form and substance
(i) Possible tasks
281. The EAA is to be created on the basis of
WEAG, the successor to the IEPG, which, as sug-
gested in a WEU document of which your Rap-
porteurs are aware, might carry out a number of
tasks:
- 
nwnogenrcnt of the EUCUD progranane:
the present most feasible prospect for the
future EAA is to take over the EUCLID
programme. The draft charter of the
WEAO has therefore been drafted to
enlarge the agency's work to include the
tasks described below, and other such
tasks as may be judged appropriate in the
future. The Research Cell's progression
to stage 2 should allow it to undertake
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contracting functions, which necessarily
implies ttrat it should become a subsidiary
body;
- 
initiating European co-operation pro-jects, each project being managed
through the appropriate structures of the
countries concerned:
in its September 1994 report, the AHSG
on the EAA considered that it would be
appropriate to entrust such projects to an
agency under procurement partnership
arrangements. It would be for nations to
utilise such arrangements as and when
proposals for co-operative projects were
agreed. It would be desirable for nations
with joint projects to consider placing
them with the agency or, altematively,
establishing them as EPOs;
- 
offthe-shelf purchases, equipment pro-
curement on the arrnnments market out-
side Europe:
it would be interesting to identify any
general category of equipment, the pro-
curement of which might be transferred
to the agency. Panel Itr has been consi-
dering the application of a common,
rationalised approach to ammunition
procurement;
- foreign military sales and non-foreign
military sales from the United States:
work has been undertaken by the AHSG
on the EAA to examine the potential
benefits of passing responsibility for the
handling of purchases from the United
States to an agency. Clearly, the United
States's reaction to such an initiative
would be a critical factor to take into
consideration. According to the second
report of the AHSG, a joint European
office handling foreign military sales
purchases (FMS) might provide some
leverage for Europeans in negotiations
with the United States on the conditions
of sale. However FMS structures are very
rigid. Moreover, the United States autho-
rities may set terms related to the least
favoured nation clause. Moreover, some
nations might be reluctant to compromise
their close bilateral links with the United
States and wish to retain existing aran-
gements. The ad hoc group's conclusions
on this matter invalidate the idea that the
creation of a joint office for promoting
American equipment would allow signi-
ficant savings to be made compared with
present arrangements;
- 
the development and managernent of
installations and means for common
testing, research and proving:
the agency is probably a suitable vehicle
for harmonising the use of existing test
facilities in WEAG nations and for pro-
curing and operating jointly future faci-
lities which are financed jointly. Pro-
gress depends on agreement between
nations to further co-operation in this
areai
- 
technology and operational studies:
the establishment of an information ser-
vice with economic, industrial and tech-
nological data providing support to
WEAG and particularly for establishing
a common armaments policy.
282. The importance of improved co-operation
from the initial stages of a project is widely recog-
nised. In this connection EDIG has often had
occasion to recall the urgent need to make pro-
gress in this area.
283. The agency might be an adequate instru-
ment for establishing the necessary technical
resources required to undertake joint studies.
Tasking for such work would be the responsibility
of the organs of WEU responsible for harmonis-
ing the long-term concepts which form the basis
for long-term military requirements. Consequently,
it would be useful to intensify co-operation
between WEAG and Eurolongterm, which has
responsibility for promoting effective long-term
military planning with a view to determining mili-
tary capabilities and equipment requirements
beyond a ten-year timescale.
(ii) The legal basis necessary for the creation of
an aSency
284. Under Article V[tr of the modified Brussels
Treaty, the Council of WEU may set up such sub-
sidiary bodies as may be considered necessary. A
subsidiary body shares WEU's legal personality
and thus is able to pass contracts and bring actions
at law, for example. Although estabtshed by the
Council, subsidiary bodies are not necessarily
placed under its direct authority.
285. Were it to take a decision in favour of the
agency, the Council should, in accordance with
the Petersberg declaration, do so at the level of
thirteen nations, so that the interests of all WEAG
members are taken into account. The functions,
mandate and powers of this subsidiary body
would be set out in a charter to be approved by all
the nations.
(iii) The Western European Armaments Organisa-
tion (WEAO)
286. At their meeting in March 1995, the NADs
agreed the proposal to create the agency as an
executive organ of a Western European Arma-
ments Organisation. The members of the AHSG
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on the EAA stated in their 1994 report that the
WEU Council would establish an organisation
(the Western European Armaments Organisation
- 
WEAO) comprising a Board of Directors
(BOD) 
- 
the highest policy and management level
of the WEAO 
- 
and an executive agency under
the direction of the BOD. The latter would be
composed of the WEAG NADs or their represen-
tatives. The aims of the WEAO would be to
sffenglhen European co-operation on armaments,
improve the defence technology base and support
the creation of a European defence equipment
market, in accordance with WEAG principles.
287. Some of the tasks entrusted to the agency
would be undertaken at the level of thirteen
nations and others on behaH of a limited number
of countries. It is therefore necessary for the agen-
cy's charter to make provision for activities brin-
ging together groups of countries in a " procure-
mentpartnership ". The agency would technically
be accountable to all thirteen nations for the acti-
vities of a procurement partnership. However it is
possible, by agreement between the thirteen
WEAG member states, for the subsidiary body to
form within the agency groupings of countries
interested in a procurement partnership, while still
retaining WEU's legal personality.
288. Each procurement partnership would be
established by agreement between the partici-
pating nations. Such an agrcement would include
the creation of a programme office to manage
the activities envisaged under the partnership
agreement. It is possible that some activities
may involve the combination of activities by thir-
teen nations and activities involving a more limi-
ted number (the EUCLID programme is an
answer). The concept envisaged by the AHSG
establishes a scale of activities within the agency,
linking them to various arrangements:
- 
the charter, setting out the overall func-
tions and rules of the WEAO;
- 
arrangements regulating activities at the
level of thirteen (for example the
EUCLID progrrunme's RTMC ee);
- 
arrangements regulating procurement
partnerships, in other words the activities
undertaken on behalf of a more limited
number of interested nations (for
example to direct EUCLID research and
technology projects 
- 
RTPs).
289. One of the options supported by several
countries would be to regroup under the aegis of
the agency a series of bilateral and multilateral
co-operation initiatives, which might include
the creation of the Franco-German sffucture the
two countries in question plan to establish on
lst January 1996 to manage joint projects. This
agency would thus provide WEU countries with a
convenient framework for joint programmes
without their having to set up costly administra-
tive offices for each co-operation initiative.
290. The Horizon antiair frigate programme
would be a logical candidate for the agency under
WEU status. Developed by France, Italy and the
United Kingdom, the programme is managed by a
London-based joint prograrnme offrce which has
no legal standing and thus cannot award contracts
or take any legal steps to subcontract to the natio-
nal procurement agencies of the three countries.
291. Another European programme, the NH-90
helicopter, might also qualify. This is run by a
four-nation management agency established
under the aegis of NATO, although the NH-90 is
not a NAIO prograrnme, because no other legal
status was available at the time the programme
was started.
292. Relations between a Western European
Armaments Organisation and the Council of
WEU would be the same as those that exist
between WEAG and the Council. In accordance
with the six principles agreed for the incorpora-
tion of the IEPG into WEU and approved by the
Council of Ministers in Bonn, in June 1992, then
reaffirmed in Rome in May 1993, European anna-
ments co-operation is placed under the responsi-
bility of the WEAG ministers of defence and
national armaments directors. The 1992 basic
principles would apply to WEAO as follows:
- 
all members would participate, with the
same rights and responsibilities, in any
armaments co-operation forum;
- 
there should be a single European arma-
ments co-operation forum in order to
avoid any duplication;
- 
the organisation's activities in Europe
should be managed by the national arma-
ments directors who will be accountable
to their defence ministers;
- 
the link between the IEPG and EDIG
should be maintained;
- 
this body should be based initially on the
agreed policies of the IEPG and maintain
existing links with NATO.
The future Westem European Armaments Organi-
sation would therefore be answerable to the latter.
The EPO (European Project Offices) would also
be accountable to the defence ministers and the
NADs.
WEAG and the European project ffices (EPO)
293. Although theoretically possible, the solu-
tion of constituting WEAG as WEAO is not
recommended by the AHSG. The activities of
4t
99. Research and Technological Management Committee.
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WEAG extend beyond the management of exe-
cutive tasks of an agency and the designation of
WEAG as a subsidiary body of WEU would
have implications for the position of states which
are not full members. At present the group does
not consider this stage to be necessary since it
sees the WEAO as an organisation separate from
WEAG. Thus the armaments secretariat and the
panels would remain responsible for WEAG's
activities.
294. Countries might, if they wished, establish
European project offices as subsidiary bodies
separate from WEAO under their own statutes.
The designation EPO refers to large projects
involving a limited number of nations, such as the
Eurofighter 2000 or the next-generation
Anglo/FrencMtalian frigate. The advisability or
otherwise of establishing the EPO as separate sub-
sidiary bodies is still open to discussion. In its
1994 rcport the AHSG stressed that it would be
for nations establishing a large new project to
decide whether they wished it to be handled by
the EAA or by a separate body. It is nevertheless
to be expected that an EPO would operate as far as
possible in accordance with agreed WEAG proce-
dures and would make maximum use of the ser-
vices of the agency, should one exist, where this
offers value for money.
Charter and general memorandum of under-
standing
295. A draft charter for the WEAO, setting out
its authority and powers and a draft general
memorandum of understanding (GMO[I) on the
principles for the operation and administration of
the WEAO have been drawn up by the AHSG and
agreed as far as possible by atl WEAG nations.
However the AHSG was unable to resolve diffi-
culties in a number of areas and at their October
1995 meeting the NADs failed to resolve differ-
ences on the following questions:
Admini str ativ e c o st - s har in g key
For procurement partnerships, which are
expected in the longer term to account for
most of the agency's work, cost-sharing
arrangements would be agreed by the rele-
vant participants and set out in subordinate
arrangements. However, for tasks carried
out on behalf of and of equal benefit to all
participants (studies for example) a cost-
sharing key will be required to be set out in
the general MOU. Clearly it would make
sense for this to be the general WEAG cost-
sharing key; however some nations are not
satisfied with the WEAG key as it stands
and could not accept its adoption, even ini-
tially, as the basis for sharing costs for com-
mon activities in the agency. Resolution of
this issue requires either:
(i) the formulation of a new WEAG cost-
sharing key acceptable to all nations,
which could also be used as the cost
sharing key for activities carried out
by the agency on behalf of all parti-
cipants; or
(ii) the formulation of a cost-sharing key
specifically for activities carried out by
the agency on behalf of all participants.
P rocureme nt principl e s
The general MOU, in the section dealing
with contracts, covers the issue of procure-
ment principles for the agency. Panel Itr
has been unable to reach unanimity on the
ten draft procurement principles. Although
there is general agreement on eight of the
principles, two cannot be agreed. Principle
9 on the settlement of disputes is rejected in
particular by the United Kingdom, which
does not accept recourse to arbitration as
long as a contract has not been awarded.
Principle 10, concerning the defence indus-
try and technology base (DITB), has not
been validated either. Here again the Uni-
ted Kingdom stands alone, refusing to
entertain any reference to maintaining the
DITB as a procurement principle, even one
with a weighting. Thus the situation at pre-
sent seems deadlocked. Moreover principle
5 on the award of contracts has been the
subject of bitter argument within Panel III's
subgroup on the EAA, the smaller coun-
tries demanding that more importance be
given to fair return and to maintaining
expertise in DDI countries. The new draft
of this principle gives fair return more than
its due share of importance, thus placing a
financial burden on the practical operation
of a future EAA.
The AHSG feels that the ten principles
should remain provisional until such time
as all are agreed. Also, as outlined in the
report by Panel III, it has become apparent
that present procurement aJTangements for
the EUCLID prograrnme are not consistent
with those planned for the wider field of
action of the EAA. The draft genera1 MOU
includes a provision which excludes
EUCLID procurement from the stated prin-
ciples; however NADs may consider it
anomalous that what might be the inaugural
task for an EAA would not be using " stan-
dard o'EAA procurement practices.
Exemptionfrom taxes and custom.s duties
The existing text, which is supported by the
majority of nations, provides that, if a parti-
cipating state cannot waive these charges,
the expenses to cover them would be borne
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by the participating state imposing them.
Certain countries cannot accept this and the
text remains provisional.
296. The NADs are asked to consider these
issues and provide guidance, as appropriate for
the AHSG. At their meeting on 20th October, they
were not in a position to reach agrcement on these
points and speed up the process.
The decision to establish the WEAO
297. As confirmed by the NADs at their spring
1995 meeting, and in the spirit of the six key prin-
ciples which guided discussions on the incorpora-
tion of the functions of the IEPG into WEU, any
decision to establish the WEAO must be made at
the level of thirteen nations. Once a decision is
taken, political agreement will be required at
defence minister level.
298. The organisation could be created as a
structure into which various activities might be
integrated as and when required. To this end, the
appointment of a general manager is proposed and
a minimum staff to establish an initial infrastruc-
ture.
299. Conversely, the NADs and defence minis-
ters may consider that the organisation should be
established only when a frst significant task has
been determined. If in spring 1996 the NADs
decide to proceed to a step 2 Research Cell, this
might be the agency's flust task.
P rocedure to be followed for establishing the We s-
tern European Armaments O rganisation
300. According to the preceding decisions of the
NADs, it will be necessary to obtain the political
agreement of the WEAG defence ministers for
creating the Westem European Armaments Org-
anisation. The WEAG defence ministers may then
ask the WEU Council of Ministers to adopt their
conclusions ofFrcially and give their agreement to
the charter. These decisions are to be taken by
thirteen members. At the NADs meeting on 20th
October no political agreement was reached
which might advance this process and enable such
an organisation to be created. Officially, the adop-
tion of the charter will, when the time is ripe,
depend on a decision to be taken by ten members
of the Council and it is expected that the three
members of WEAG which are not full members
of WEU (Denmark, Norway and T[rkey) will be
linked to WEAG by an exchange of letters. In
practice, this exchange might be effected on
behalf of the Council by the Chairman of the
Council of Ministers. Once exchanged, the letters
will be officially annexed to the charter.
301. Once the political conditions have been
met, these initiatives will lead to the establish-
ment of the Western European Armaments Orga-
nisation which will be a subsidiary body of WEU.
302. The final stage in the procedure will be the
signing of the general memorandum of under-
standing by the defence ministers of the countries
intending to take paft in the organisation. This act
will commit the countries to finance its activities
and only the counffies which intend to participate
will have to sign this document. WEAG countries
not wishing to participate in the Western Euro-
pean Armaments Organisation on its creation will
have the possibility of signing the general memo-
randum of understanding later in order to become
members of the organisation.
A charter for the European project ffices (EPO)
303. Following the timetable wished by the
NADs, the third report of the ad-hoc study group
dealt mainly with working out the charter and the
general memorandum of understanding of WEAG
and examination of the procedure to be followed
for creating the agency. The elaboration of a
model charter for the European project offices
which would be created outside the structure of
the European Armaments Agency was considered
by the ad-hoc group as a less urgent task.
304. Furthermore, although the task of the ad-
hoc sub group regarding the charter and general
memorandum of understanding of the Westem
European Armaments Organisation is almost
completed, nothing has yet been done to complete
the model charter for the European project
offices. Furthermore, in the discussions, it seems
that it would perhaps be necessary to examine
more closely the cost and practical arrangements
necessary for setting up an agency, either as a
simple structure to which activities might be
ffansferred as required, or as a host organisation
for the Research Cell (Step 2).
305. It is to be regretted that, at their meeting on
20th October 1995, the NADs did not decide to
lay the cornerstones of a Western European
Armaments Organisation. They merely took note
of the draft charter and general memorandum of
understanding for the organisation. It is already
known that this question is not on the agenda of
the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers in
Madrid on 13th November.
306. As to the prospects of a European Arma-
ments Agency, several options can already be
seen. The minimum option would be to make the
agency a kind of secretariat, with minimum
means and responsible for a small number of
important prograrnmes. The lack of political will
in Europe regarding identity of views on opera-
tional requirements and/or the monopolisation ofjoint requirements for collective access at transat-
lantic level would prevent joint requirements
from being defined, however necessary they
might be.
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307. A more elaborate solution would be pos-
sible if the WEAG countries were to transfer their
research and significant armaments programmes
to the agency (through the intermediary of the
EUCLID cell). Compulsory prograrnmes would
be the central nucleus and complementary
and more limited co-operation would form the
periphery. The latter might be managed by legal
structures placed at the disposal of the partner
countries by WEU, in a manner similar to that of
the NATO agencies.
308. In view of the latest discussions by the
NADs, the first option seems the most plausible
as matters now stand. Although a minimal one, it
might be a first step towards more sophisticated
formulas. If it were decided to create an agency at
the minimum level, it would be necessary to pro-
vide for means of reassessing its working, tasks
and means. This procedure for reassessing would
have to be set in motion by the member states and
would help to maintain the drive in the process
towards the integration of defence markets and
industries in Europe tm.
309. Although not envisaged in the short term,
the creation of an agency with its own legal per-
sonality and financial means responsible for plan-
ning a European approach to industrial and tech-
nological policy is still nevertheless a goal to be
achieved in the medium term, once some of the
obstacles have been removed.
310. Fina1ly, unrealistic as matters now stand,
the maximal solution of instituting a proper Euro-
pean armaments procurement agency is neverthe-
less the final stage of European integration of
national defence policies.
311. Probably the introduction of a European
Armaments Agency will be achieved very pro-
gressively and selectively. Several factors will
influence the future of this project: the evolution
of the European strategic theatre, that of transat-
lantic relations and the definition of a European
defence policy, the rhythm the states decide upon
to organise their armaments programmes at Euro-
pean level and, finally, their political determi-
nation to define " joint requirements " and the
resulting equipment.
(c) The FrancoGerman initiative
312. On the occasion of the Franco-German
summit meeting in Bonn in December 1993, the
defence ministers, Mr. L6otard and Mr. Riihe,
decided to create a cornmon armaments agency
with the task of managing bilateral programmes
100. Towards the creation of a European Arrnaments Agency,
Pierre de Vestel (research attach6 at GRIP, Brussels) in WEU
and the European defence policy, Political and social pro-
blems No. 754, Documentation Frangaise, 1995.
with a view to improving efficiency in these pro-
grammes and reducing management costs.
313. With the decision to set up a structured
bilateral body to simphfy the present organisation
governing armaments and research programmes
for Franco-German co-operation and to manage
present and future bilateral programmes, new pro-
gress was made in co-operationtot.
314. The two defence ministers were indeed pre-
senting a proposal for a common agency although
their words were not explicit, perhaps for diplo-
matic reasons in regard to the United Kingdom,
for instance. At the close of the December 1993
meeting, one Frenchman and a German were
appointed to work on the question and make spec-
ific proposals.
315. The 63rd Franco-German summit meeting
held in Mulhouse in June 1994 speeded up plans
for a Franco-German arrnaments structure and its
creation was foreseen for September 1995. With
the conclusion of the preparatory stage of this
bilateral initiative, it was decided that the agency
would be inaugurated officially on lst January
1996.
Missions
316. The value of Franco-German co-operation
represents in all some F 4.5 billion. In addition to
production prograrnmes, particularly for missiles,
it concerns mainly the development of heli-
copters, armoured vehicles, etc. The total cost of
bilateral programmes is more than F 60 billion.
This fact partly justifies the proposed Franco-
German sffucture for armaments.
317. The programme of the two main countries
participating in European co-operation is, inter
alia, destined to rationalise structures and the cost
of armaments for the two partners which have to
respect considerable budgetary constraints and
are required to work together more and more
often, particularly through the European Corps.
318. It is planned to integrate in this Franco-
German structure the bilateral armaments pro-
grammes for the Tiger combat helicopter, the
modular armoured vehicle, Roland missiles, and
the Milan and Hot Euromissiles. The agency
should also handle Franco-German participation
in multilateral co-operation programmes such as
the NH-90 helicopter, the future large aircraft,
satellites, and the Trigat anti-tank missile with the
United Kingdom. This structure should also cover
bilateral co-operation in research and technology
which is already the subject of eighty pro-
grarnmes. Finally, the agency should also conduct
parametric studies in long-term planning for the
4
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years 2010-2015, and very upstream operational
and technical studies of future threats.
319. As mentioned in an earlier report by the
WEU Assembly in 1994 (Rapporteur: Mr. Borde-
ras), the Franco-German agency would create a
single management office which would lead to the
disappearance of national offices and would
consequently result in financial savings and
greater management efficiency.
320. Furthermore, one of the aims of the Franco-
German initiative might be to endeavour to solve
one of the main problems of European co-opera-
tion: rather than accumulate national approaches
and often additional cost, an aftempt should be
made to select certain national methods for inte-
gration into a grouping in its own right. To this
end, some integration and independence in regard
to the national authorities would probably be
necessary. It is not impossible that in this more
restricted framework, relations befween the two
countries being already firmly established, one of
the major questions of co-operation might be partly
answered; is it not possible to envisage some
delegation of sovereignty to the Franco-German
agency, some independence and better integration
ifrelations are close and habits already taken?
An initiative complementary to the creation of the
Europ e an Armament s A ge ncy
321. From the very outset, everything seemed to
indicate that this agency would not be destined to
constifute the initial nucleus of the future Euro-
pean Armaments Agency. It was intended rather
to stimulate the creation and development of the
latter by following a parallel course, while initially
retaining its bilateral character, subsequently to be
integrated into the agency. Moreover, the word
agency was officially avoided so that the bilateral
structure would not seem to be in competition
with the planned European agency.
322. At the Noordwijk meeting in 7994, the
French and German defence ministers said the
Franco-German agency was seen as a first step
prior to the constitution of a European Armaments
Agency planned by the Maastricht Treaty. Indeed,
the Franco-Gernan sffucture is clearly destined to
give decisive stimulus to the rationalisation of
European resources in the field of armaments.
This bilateral agency might become one of the
pillars of a European Armaments Agency 
'@.
323. Clearly, the idea follows the logic of the
multinational units being formed and first and
foremost the European Corps. The Franco-
German initiative, for the time being limited to
fwo countries, should be extended rapidly to the
problems of interoperabilify and then standardisa-
102. Defense News, 16th-22nd October 1995, pages 4 and
100.
tion, with a view to equipping the European Corps
in co-operation. Since the lafter is no longer sfrictly
bilateral, there are grounds for co-operation being
transferred, in this particular respect, to a broader
European grouping.
324. The question of wider participation is still
pertinent. In November 1994, the United King-
dom asked to take part in the Franco-Gennan pro-ject. At the meeting of the WEU Council of
Ministers in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, Bel-
gium, Italy, together with Spain and Luxembourg,
also mentioned their interest in the Franco-
German structure. Quite possibly in the future
Belgium and the Netherlands will be included
since they both have close links with Germany
and also because there also is ajoint anny corps.
France for its part might be inclined to form an-
other type of agency with Italy, with which it
shares several programmes such as the NH-90
helicopter, Aster missiles, torpedoes and satellites.
325. After making known their intention to hand
over the management of certain co-operative
armaments programmes to a possible European
agency founded by France and Germany, the Uni-
ted Kingdom and Italian Defence Ministers affir-
med in March 1995 that the new agency might
take over two major co-operation programmes,
the Eurofighter 2000 and the new generation
Horizon frigate. On that occasion, the Italian
Defence Minister, Domenico Corcione, expressed
the idea that the agency be created so as to ration-
alise European procurement structures and pre-
pare for the long termr03. He added that the man-
agement of the Eurofighter programme by the
Franco-German structure would be a means for
Italy to reduce its overall procurement costs.
326. The Franco-British offer is the more
notable in that France is not participating in the
Eurofighter programme and Germany is not
involved in that of the Horizon frigate. Italian and
British authorities also stress that by associating
their programmes within the Franco-German
structure they will reduce substantially their
management overheads.
327. At the NADs meeting in March 1995, Mr.
Roger Freeman, Secretary of State for Procure-
ment, said that the United Kingdom wished
to leave the agency responsibility for three other
programmes: the Franco-German modular
armoured vehicle prograrnme, in which the United
Kingdom hoped to take part in the near future, the
development of new communications satellites
and of new air-to-air missiles.
328. The recent popularity of the Franco-German
initiative among European govemments is never-
theless a thorny problem for the two countries
45
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which launched this project in the middle of 1993.
Indeed, the reluctance of their partners to join a
multilateral agency incited France and Germany
at the time to go ahead with the creation of a bila-
teral agency. Several countries then voiced their
fears of being excluded and asked to take part
with the result that the two original countries have
invited their European allies to be associated with
the new agency, knowing only too well that
broader participation might slow down or even
hold up its achievement.
329. France and Germany intend to lose no time
in creating a bilateral body capable of awarding
contracts, with WEU status, and open to other
partners from the moment they accept the prin-
ciples.
330. However this may be, if France and Ger-
many say they are prepared to accept other coun-
tries joining their undertaking, it is on the condi-
tion that this in no way detracts from what has
been achieved bilaterally.
The legalframework
331. Tlvo approaches have been under study for
several months to define the legal framework in
which the Franco-Gernan initiative should be set.
The first solution, which envisaged a fieaty
between the two countries, proved to be the least
acceptable; indeed, not only did the Elys6e Treaty
not concem armaments specifically, but in addi-
tion it entailed compulsory ratification by parlia-
ment regarding which there might be some uncer-
tainty where the Bundestag is concerned.
Furthermore, a strictly bilateral approach would
close the door to plans to promote a European
armaments dimension.
332. The second solution would be to grant the
Franco-German structure the status of subsidiary
body of the WEU Council.
333. France and Germany apparently prefer this
approach, which confirms their political determi-
nation to move in the direction of Europe by inte-
grating their project into the only real European
body responsible for defence questions, WEU.
This altemative however needs the approval of all
members of WEAG which is not yet guaranteed.
The constitution of a Franco-German structure as
a subsidiary body of WEU was well and truly on
the agenda of the NADs meeting on 20th October
1995, but this proposal was not endorsed by dl
European partners.
334. If the European partners refuse to grant
WEU status to the Franco-German structure,
France and Germany would probably be obliged
to proceed on a bilateral basis. As Emile Blanc,
Chairman of the WEAG NADs, emphasised,
what is important is to lose no time in starting the
practical building of Europe in the field of arma-
ments 's. Acting in step with the evolution of per-
ceptions and policies of the thirteen WEAG coun-
tries will not give the necessary impetus, this
being a slow and progressive process which has to
be anticipated rather than followed.
335. At the WEAG NADs meeting on 20th
October 1995, France and Germany presented the
Franco-German initiative to their European part-
ners. Known as the Franco-German co-operation
sffucture, this initiative was discussed and reser-
vations were made within the group. Considering
that it was not for them to decide on this matter,
the NADs recommended that the defence minis-
ters of WEAG themselves examine the question at
their next meeting on 13th November.
VI. Conclusions
336. Europe's defence industry is at present in a
difficult and delicate position. Europe is faced
with a challenge. Indeed, the credibility of its
security and its defence, included among its aims
in the Maastricht Treaty, calls for independent
means which inevitably depend on a defence
industry which must also be truly European.
Defence-related firms in Europe have remained
very national. However advanced and productive
this industry may be, its characteristics are the dis-
persion of its European actors and the fragment-
ation of its capabilities.
337. In addition to the compression of defence
budgets, the reduction of the market and keen
competition, particularly from the United States,
there is also the technological evolution leading to
an exponential increase in the cost of new wea-
pons systems. The armaments industry therefore
has an excessive production capability. This is
particularly true in Europe where each country
tends to retain a maximum independent national
capability. Unlike the situation in the United
States, there is no domestic market in Europe
large enough to amortise research and develop-
ment investment, and even industrialisation, in
economic conditions that can be bome by national
budgets. Clearly, a domestic European market is
the essential foundation for a European indusffy
which is competitive at world level.
338. Survival of the defence industry in Europe
depends therefore on joining forces. Stemming
from political determination in the sixties, Euro-
pean co-operation has subsequently been exten-
ded for economic reasons. Co-operation has been
of a variable geometry type, programme by pro-
gramme. It has led to many prograrnmes, some of
which were a great success, particularly in aero-
nautics, missiles and space; serious difficulties
have been encountered elsewhere.
104. Interview of Mr. Emile Blanc in La Tribune Desfoss6s,
23rd August l995,page 13.
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339. Today, these efforts are not enough. The
defence indusuy must be restructured and rationa-
lised, both at national level and in a European frame-
work. To avoid costly and useless redundancy,
future alliances depend on a division or sharing of
responsibilities, some of which the states consider
to be strategic. The tendency is increasingly
towards the constitution of transnational firms
with access to a wide market and having the bene-
fit of economies of scale. To create the conditions
for this major restructuring, the states concerned
must agree on the definition of joint requirements
so as to create a large enough market. It is also
necessary for the states and industries to agree on
the necessary sharing of responsibilities with due
regard for the dependence this process involves.
340. If no European nation is henceforth any
longer in a position to maintain an industry that
alone meets its defence requirements, Europe as a
whole has the political, technological and econo-
mic capabilities required to create a strong and
competitive European defence industry. Present
co-operation in armaments in the broadest sense
must be strengthened and improved.
341. The transfer of the IEPG to WEU allows
efforts to improve co-ordination between Euro-
pean counffies in armaments matters to be ratio-
nalised. It places co-operation in a firmer institu-
tional framework than was the case in the IEPG. It
offers possibilities for decisive progress which
may be little more than wishful thinking if not
followed up by firm political determination.
342. The WEAG structures and its guiding prin-
ciples again take up those that were defined ini-
tially for the IEPG:
- 
WEAG is a strictly intergovernmental
instrument of co-operation. Since arma-
ments concem the exercise of sovereignty,
the thirteen states of WEAG decided to
keep to a non-binding juridical system
. with light common structures and the
decision-making process respects the
principle of unanimity, the limits of
which can now be assessed;
- 
furthermore, WEAG takes a global
approach to armaments problems. The
harmonisation of requirements, pro-
grarnmes and co-operation, research and
development and procurement policy are
all considered to be complementary
areas of action, the pursuit of which must
be achieved in a coherent manner;
- 
finally, to strengthen the industrial and
technological basis ofdefence in Europe,
WEAG is co-operating closely with
European industries represented by
EDIG. This permanent association of
state representatives and industrial
circles is an important and original
aspect of WEAG.
343. While all in all WEAG is working satisfac-
torily, certain limits and obstacles are slowing
down and even paralysing the work and evolution
of WEAG.
3M. One of Europe's handicaps is the dispersal
and fragmentation of efforts in research, develop-
ment and technology. Sharing the cost of research
and development is increasingly necessary. Yet
co-operation is encountering technical and politi-
cal difficulties. Partnership research presupposes
that participants have reached agreement on the
technology they are prepared to share. Procedures
are lengthy and negotiations extremely slow and
difficult between WEAG countries. EUCLID is
therefore exposed to competition from bilateral
co-operation, which is easier to manage. The
impact of co-operation, however, should not be
underestimated; indeed, the difficulties raised by
harmonisation of requirements at European level
will be solved completely only if the process of
harmonisation starts upstream at the stage of
research. Thus, to relaunch the programme means
shortening timescales and paring procedure. Fur-
thermore, the Eurofinder machinery should be
strengthened to allow firms direct access to the
EUCLID prograrnme. It is also urgent to define
priority missions and select corresponding critical
technology in order to optimise efforts at the Euro-
pean level as early as possible.
345. The opening of national defence markets to
transnational competition allowing a large enough
intra-European market to be established is still at
the stage of intentions. Governments have only
their national tools to regulate the work of the
defence industries. WEAG has no power to regu-
late transfrontier activities. The most important
arms-producing countries have varying attitudes
towards application of joint measures with regard
to competition in particular and industrial and
frade policies. Although the common foreign and
security policy has a framework, the govemments
still fail to agree on starting the process and the
type of industrial structure they propose to set
up in the armaments sector although this is neces-
sary to underpin a common foreign and security
policy.
346. Some countries, in particular France, consi-
der that it is urgent to create European firms
capable of competing with the United States and
seeking agreement on reciprocal access for Euro-
pean and American firms to their respective mar-
kets. According to this view, obstacles to indus-
trial concentrations within WEAG's Europe
should therefore be removed. Moreover, although
at present agreement on a dual-flow system seems
excluded, it is necessary not to lay down the law
but rather for practice to respect European solida-
rity on questions of procurement. Other countries
such as Germany see this concept as a form of
protectionism and are in favour of developing a
47
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real European armaments market. This approach
would call for the annulment of Article 223 of the
Treaty on European Union which, unless amen-
ded to take into account the specificity of the
armaments market, would be prejudicial to the
defence industry. The United Kingdom sees the
process in terms of total competition, profitability
of investment and best value for money. Like
France and others, it has no intention of relinqui
shing its national prerogatives in favour of Com-
munity rules and regulations. While political
authorities are hesitant about Europeanising
defence markets in Europe, industrial circles real-
ise that this process should be encouraged.
347. Furthermore, questions linked to the Euro-
pean armaments market cause a division
between countries with a large defence industry
capability and the others which still claim the
application of the principle of fair return. While
it is agreed that some diversification of produc-
tion capabilities should be preserypd in Europe
insofar as the vital interests of sovereign nations
cannot be overlooked, systematic fair return is
an economic handicap. It should bg replaced by
intelligent compensatory measures or economic
spin-off, particularly by the policy of retaining
existing areas of activity leading to specialisa-
tion. In the absence of supranational regulations,
it has to be seen whether the temptation to prefer
national interests would obstruct efforts to intro-
duce a truly European defence industry and orga-
nisation for the joint procurement of military
equipment.
348. It is necessary for the WEAG countries, or
at least some of themo to express specifically the
political will to define their military requirements
in a European framework. The harmonisation of
requirements would allow longer production runs
which would make for economies of scale, sub-
ject to a rational indusrial organisation. The crea-
tion of a single pennanent structure capable of co-
ordinating the action of official services
responsible for defining operational requirements
would consequently be useful. Furthermore, the
creation of a commiftee of chiefs of staff would
provide the necessary framework for identifyingjoint requirements justifying the production and
perhaps joint use of equipment. In another respect,
states tend to consider the activities of Eurolong-
term as being of secondary importance and having
a minor impact on the main programmes. A clea-
rer link should be established between WEAG
(Panel D and Eurolongterm in order to avoid over-
lapping and improve efficiency. The members of
Panel I should establish contact and remain in
contact with national representatives of Eurolong-
term and encourage interaction and the exchange
of information.
349. Concerning co-operation, an attempt must
be made to reduce unproductive sffategies such as
overbidding the specifications imposed by military
staff, delays in a programme with the consequent
increase in cost, the cumbersome decision-
making procedure associated with a larger num-
ber of participants, the scattering of know-how,
the creation of uncompetitive new industrial
centres where compensation cornes into play and
swells overproduction capacity. Solutions might
be found, inter alia, through upstream integration
of co-operative procedures.
350. Concerning the European Armaments
Agency, the outcome of the meeting of the NADs
on 20th October 1995 proved to be negative.
While the latter recognised the considerable pro-
gress made on the charter of the Westem Euro-
pean Armaments Organisation and the memoran-
dum of understanding, the NADs failed to reach
agrcement on the founding act of the organisation.
The obstacles raised in the report of the ad hoc
group on the European Armaments Agency sub-
mitted to the NADs introduced even more insur-
mountable difficulties. The United Kingdom
refuses any mention of a European defence indus-
try and technology base (DITB) and France is
holding up regulations on taxes. Divergencies are
even evident on the division of work and procue-
ment procedures. It would have been very surpri-
sing if the NADs had reached agreement on these
questions. The negative result allows note to be
taken of the failure of a system associating thir-
teen countries in a strictly intergovernmental
structure. Setting such high requirements and
wishing to resolve difficulties which are at present
insoluble before starting the process of creating a
European Armaments Agency may result in failu-
re and immobility. The question must necessarily
be asked at political level: does Europe want a
European armaments policy? It is perhaps now
time to envisage another course associating coun-
tries which wish to build Europe in the areas
of research and development, production,
industrialisation and the procurement of military
equipment.
35 1. It would be more efEcient and more realistic
to plan a European Armaments Agency as a
variable geometry structure grouping all the
WEAG countries, but allowing those which have
the political resolve to accelerate the process of
Europeanisation.
352. The central core today is constituted by
thirteen NADs under the authority of thirteen
defence ministers. Ten of the thirteen countries in
question have the power of subsidiarity. It might
be thought that, for any armnments activity, a cer-
tain number of general rules should be respected
on which it should be possible to obtain consensus
among the countries. These principles might
cover legal, administrative and financial matters,
disputes, the way to award contracts, etc.
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353. Starting with this central core, several
frameworks might be envisaged for carrying out
activities and programmes with thirteen partici-
pants (for example, research and development, the
production of rifles, grenades, munitions, etc.) and
reduced activities (such as off-the-shelf procure-
ment, procurement procedures) and programmes
grouping only those countries wishing to work
together and likely to agree on binding joint regula-
tions. Each framework, associating a variable num-
ber of countries, should respect the general rules
but would also have a number of specific rules.
354. The ten full members of WEU would grant
the status of subsidiary body to all or to one or
several prograrnmes on a case-by-case basis. Such
a decision would not be the responsibility of
NADs but of ministers or even of heads of state
and of government. Admittedly, this approach
would mean a de facto variable geometry anna-
ments Europe which would leave those states that
refused to accept the principles of participation
outside the active circle; but it would leave room
for political rapprochement on questions on
which at the present time there is no convergence
and therefore no unanimity.
355. Besides this, such an organisation should
be planned as part of a larger framework, the
European Union. Use should be made of the com-
plementarity between the community and inter-
govemmental blocs. The European Union, and in
particular the Commission, has financial means
and a number of resources which could be adap-
ted to benefit the European defence industry.
356. For instance, the European Union might
facilitate investment required for defence work in
some small countries and would thus help to insti-
tute a kind of European solidarity which is essen-
tial for working out aproper European armaments
policy. Perhaps the Community pillar might also
accompany industrial restructuring in Europe;
however this may be, reluctant states would have
to accept the idea of involving the European
Union in certain activities linked with armaments;
the position of the Community institutions would
also have to change, as seems to be the case in
some circles of the European Commission, by
taking into account all the implications of the
armaments sector and by admitting that the regu-
lation of the single market cannot be applied in its
present state to the defence industries.
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APPENDIX TI
The Earopean defence industry 
- 
an agenda itemfor
the 1 996 intergovernmental conference
Executive summil-y
1 . The key issue
To sustain an effective operational capabi
lity, European armed forces require high techno-
logy and cost-effective equipment at a price the
nations can afford. Europe should not become
dependent on third countries in the area of arma-
ments, for political, technical and economic rea-
sons. It is therefore essential to maintain a
modern, efficient and competitive defence indus-
try in Europe as an integral part of its security
ilTangements.
Furthermore, Europe's ability to fund its
own defence is dependent on its economic strength
to which its defence industry, through exports and
denied imports, is a major contributor.
The European defence industry is facing
profound changes resulting from a totally new
strategic, military and economic environment. Its
situation has become very serious in the past few
years because of:
- 
the large reductions in defence budgets
in Europe;
- 
the shrinking world market;
- 
exacerbated competition from third
countries, particularly the United States
where, amongst other factors, industry is
going through a process of profound
restructuring to improve output;
- 
and vulnerability to artificially under-
valued currencies causing short-term
market distortion.
The future of the European defence indus-
try is seriously threatened by the fragmentation of
the market, the duplication and oversizing of
many capabilities. At the same time and in some
countries, significant capabilities in technology
and production are beginning to disappear.
The industry has already undertaken much
restructuring, under commercial pressure, mostly
on a national basis. However, in the absence of a
minimum common security policy in Europe,
transnational industrial restructuring will con-
tinue under commercial pressure but may not
result in the best solution for Europe.
The prime issue at stake is therefore the
survival of a comprehensive and competitive
European defence industry and technology base.
A strong collective effort to tackle these issues
must be made urgently by European governments
who are customers in a monopsonistic situation.
The European defence industry is placing
real hopes in the 1996 intergovernmental confer-
ence in the expectation of significant progress lea-
ding to the construction of a common European
defence.
2.The way ahead
If the defence industries are to survive to
support the future defence and foreign policy of
the European governments with the appropriate
high qualiry, technologically advanced and com-
petitively priced products, then a European
domestic market of sufficient size should be esta-
blished. It will provide a foundation upon which
the European defence industry may embrace
transnational rationalisation to sustain its global
competitiveness.
The sffength of all other major amament
industries is based on a large home market. ln the
European domestic market, procurement of
equipment designed, developed and produced in
Europe should be preferred, it being understood
that effective reciprocity with third countries
should be achieved in case of procurement outside
Europe.
The major prerequisite to establishing a
European domestic market will be that the mem-
ber governments harmonise their operational
requirements to make common procurements pos-
sible. Other sensitive and complicated problems
will have to be resolved: harmonisation of acqui-
sition procedures, laws and regulations, stan-
dards, security of supply, reciprocity of market
access within Europe, work share and industrial
return and export controls. The satisfactory reso-
lution of such questions is of vital importance to
both governments and industry.
This European domestic market will only
be set up and organised if there is genuine co-
operation among European states.
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A mechanism of European solidarity between
nations will have to be established. This European
solidarity should aim to achieve an equitable
share of work and responsibility among all the
European countries as well as a high level of
competitiveness.
The restructuring process of the European
defence industry is not yet complete and its suc-
cessful continuation implies the active involve-
ment of the European governments.
A comprehensive European research and
technology policy is required to secure the future
of the European technological industrial base.
The European industry is facing exacer-
bated competition on the export market, parti-
cularly from the United States industry supported
by its government. Equivalent support must be
given to the European industry.
Arangements between nations for export
control are required for the short term as well as
for the long term. This is a basic condition for the
development of European co-operation.
Implementation of the above policy
in armament matters will require the preparation
of new action plans. A transition between the cur-
rent situation and this new framework has to be
organised.
It is pointed out that Article 223 of the
Rome Treaty should be maintained for the
moment. This article is not an obstacle to the new
framework. It constitutes the only protection
which may be used by the govemments, if neces-
sary, during the transitional period.
3. Recommendations to be addressed during the
1 996 intergovernmental conference
There is an essential requirement for the
expression of a European political will to foster
the fundamental interest of the defence industries
of all European countries and the following
recommendations should be addressed during the
1996 intergovernmental conference and imple-
mented by formal decisions of the conference:
(a) The European defence industry and
technology base should be recognised as a
vital strategic asset and its maintenance as a
prerequisite for the establishment of a
genuine European security and defence
identity.
(b) A European domestic market of suffi-
cient size should be established to provide a
foundation upon which the European
defence industry may sustain its global
competitiveness. This requires that:
- 
operational requirements harmonisation
be taken as the cornerstone to progress,
which demands that greater negotiating
authority be given to the military bodies
currently tasked for this purpose in
Western European Union;
- 
in parallel, harmonisation of acquisition
procedures, laws, regulations and stan-
dards for defence procurement must be
achieved. A European armaments agency
should be set up as soon as possible to
manage joint activities;
- 
a well-structured co-operative frame-
work should be developed with appro-
priate arrangements between nations,
ensuring competitiveness and effective
economic retum but avoiding unnecessary
duplications;
- 
procurement from European industry is
to be the preferred course of action.
(c) The operation of such a European
defence equipment market requires a prin-
ciple of European solidarity which assumes
that partner nations accept industriaVtech-
nological interdependence and apply trans-
national budgetary support in pursuance of
that aim.
(d) ln the specific conditions of this mar-
keto true success of the industry restructu-
ring will only be achieved if industrial ini-
tiative takes place under an overall policy
framework to be agreed by the govern-
ments involved, including in particular:
- 
procurement plans and principles;
- 
administrative and financial measures to
facilitate the process;
- 
bilateral or multilateral programmes
involving the new structure.
(e) The long-term maintenance of the
European defence industrial technology
base requires investment in "leading edge"
technology programmes, by:
- 
identifying critical technologies to be
sustained in Europe;
- 
reinvigorating collaborative research and
technology programmes such as
EUCLID;
- 
promoting demonstrator projects in
Europe.
(fl TheEuropean industry needs full politi-
cal, military and financial support from the
governments on the world export market.
As far as export control is concerned, the
following should apply:
- 
the supply of defence equipment to
European governments as well as the
sale of components or subsystems to
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European exporting companies should
be unrestricted;
until a European export policy for sales
outside Europe has been agreed and a
European authority has been approved
and a European authority given the res-
ponsibility to apply it, such sales should
be conffolled by the nation of the expor-
ting company;
administrative export procedures should
be harmonised as soon as possible.
(il In the case of procurement outside
Europe, which should be exceptional, the
industrial benefits to the European nations
should be:
- 
for co-operative programmes, work-
shares in proportion to their national
contribution to aprogramme both in qua-
lity and in quantity;
- 
for off+he-shelf purchases, either pro-
portionate offsets or effective reciprocal
access to the relevant market.
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